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ABSTRACT 
In its foundational case law, the Supreme Court of Canada linked the duty to consult and 
accommodate to the purpose of reconciliation. However, the Canadian legal rules on the duty to 
consult, as presently structured and developed by case law, do not adequately fulfill that purpose. 
The Court has also consistently stated that the duty to consult and accommodate does not include 
an obligation to reach an agreement. This judicial pronouncement appears to provide the 
government an opportunity to approach consultation processes in a manner that merely seeks to 
reach the minimal requirements, without requiring an effective and meaningful dialogue. A 
minimum-requirement approach to consultation and accommodation would leave the protective 
and reconciliation purpose of section 35 significantly unsatisfied. Aboriginal engagement for 
future development should embrace a collaborative approach such that the Crown’s decisions 
affecting Aboriginal and treaty rights do not amount to a unilateral exercise of power, but rather, 
promote the goal of reconciliation with Aboriginal peoples.   
Although the jurisprudence in Haida Nation creates a useful path for achieving the protective 
and reconciliation purpose of section 35, it remains the case that without extending the Supreme 
Court’s articulation of the duty to consult process, the fundamental goal of section 35 may 
actually remain unachieved. This thesis makes this argument using the particular example of the 
possible development and placement of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) within the traditional 
territory of Aboriginal communities.  This perspective involves a novel technology as an 
example of future development, where there is a new opportunity to engage in consultation in 
better ways than may have occurred with legacy technologies.  
Building on the Supreme Court of Canada’s cases and academic scholarship, this thesis argues 
that implementing a standard for consultation that aims at consent would better respect the 
underlying law on the duty to consult and thereby improve Crown-Aboriginal relations. The 
thesis makes several recommendations:  judicial interpretation that develops factors to assess if 
consultation has aimed at consent; government co-development of consultation policies and 
practices with Aboriginal peoples; and improved practices in securing Aboriginal approval 
through agreements negotiated by project proponents. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
1.0 Introduction  
The duty to consult is an important legal doctrine that seeks to play a key role in reconciling 
Crown sovereignty with pre-existing Aboriginal claims. However, beyond the initial case law, 
the jurisprudence seems to be implemented in a manner that is sometimes inconsistent with 
reconciliation, the overarching purpose of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
1
  
Over recent years, many Crown-Aboriginal disputes have sprung from project developments 
concerning Aboriginal peoples‘ rights and claims to their traditional land. The Supreme Court of 
Canada developed the duty to consult to guide Crown-Aboriginal relationships in resource 
development and to resolve issues that may arise in this area, in keeping with section 35, the 
constitutional provision that protects Aboriginal and treaty rights by ―recognizing and affirming‖ 
them in section 35(1).
2
  
In its development of the doctrine, the Supreme Court of Canada linked the duty to consult to the 
purpose of reconciliation.
3
 The Court stated that the constitutional duty arises as an obligation on 
the Crown to consult Aboriginal peoples when it contemplates a decision that may potentially 
adversely affect Aboriginal or treaty rights. The duty to consult stems from section 35, and as 
such, it should function to achieve the protective purpose of section 35.  
In examining the role of reconciliation for the duty to consult, this thesis could make its 
argument simply by relying upon the Court‘s moderate, earlier account of reconciliation in the 
majority decision of Lamer C.J.C. in R. v. Van der Peet that interprets the concept as reconciling 
the assertion of European sovereignty with existing Aboriginal claims.
4
 However, as discussed 
                                                          
1
 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.  Section 35 recognizes and 
affirms ―existing Aboriginal and treaty rights‖.  This short guarantee has generated many cases. 
2
 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forest), 2004 SCC 73 [2004] 3 SCR 511; Taku River Tlingit First 
Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 SCR 550 [Taku River]; Mikisew 
Cree First Nation v. Canada, 2005 SCC 69, [2005] 3 SCR 388 [Mikisew Cree]. ―Aboriginal peoples‖ is the phrase 
used collectively when referring to the original peoples of Canada. Out of respect for Indigenous peoplehood, the 
phrase Aboriginal peoples will be predominantly used throughout this research work, even where the Supreme Court 
of Canada‘s terminology might refer to ―Aboriginal rights-bearing communities‖ or ―Aboriginal communities‖. The 
phrases ―Indigenous peoples‖ and ―Aboriginal peoples‖ may be used interchangeably in specific instances.  
3
 See generally, Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Governor General in Council), 2018 SCC 40, [2018] 2 SCR 
765 at para 61 [Mikisew Cree, 2018].    
4
 R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 at paras 36, 42 [Van der Peet]. 
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later in the thesis, in light of later cases discussing reconciliation, the separate account of 
reconciliation from McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Van der Peet, which emphasizes that equal 
weight must be placed on the legal perspectives of both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies, 
should also appropriately inform how the concept is understood.
5
  
Although reconciliation is discussed in detail later in this thesis, it is important to state here that 
the duty to consult is a fundamental aspect of the objective of reconciliation of Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal societies. The Supreme Court of Canada has maintained that section 35(1) is 
aimed at the reconciliation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies to achieve a mutually and 
long-lasting relationship – this involves recognizing Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal viewpoints 
when the government intends to carry out an action that affect Aboriginal peoples. As this thesis 
will detail further, according to the case law, section 35 does not guarantee Aboriginal peoples a 
veto right over a project, and consent is required only in cases that involve established rights. 
Thus, , the duty to accommodate does not require agreement to be reached. The law thus appears 
to give the Crown the chance to primarily approach consultation processes just to reach the 
minimal requirements, without effectively requiring meaningful dialogue. 
The discharge of the duty to consult in future development should be treated as a site for ongoing 
reconciliation between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples rather than a procedural box to be 
ticked. This thesis argues that making consent the required objective of consultation could 
encourage diligent approaches to consultation and enable Canada to develop a more inclusive 
approach toward reconciliation. It suggests further expansion and collaborative development of 
the duty to consult, as well as improved practices in relation to obtaining Aboriginal approval 
through negotiated agreements. 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the current discussions on the need to expand Haida Nation‘s 
jurisprudence in the area of project development in Canada. This thesis argues that although the 
jurisprudence in Haida Nation creates a useful path for fulfilling the purpose of section 35, 
without expanding the court‘s articulation of the duty to consult processes, the ultimate goal of 
section 35 may remain unachieved and the Haida Nation principles thus end up disrespected.  
                                                          
5
 Ibid, at para 35. 
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The Canadian principle of the duty to consult, as presently structured and developed by case law, 
is not sufficiently inclusive or protective of Aboriginal peoples‘ rights. An approach to 
implementing the duty to consult that requires a minimal duty from the government will leave 
the protective and reconciliation purpose of section 35 significantly unsatisfied. Consultation 
processes for future development should encompass a collaborative approach such that the 
Crown‘s decisions affecting Aboriginal and treaty rights do not amount to a unilateral exercise of 
power, but rather promote the goal of reconciliation with Aboriginal peoples. A minimum-
requirement approach to consultation and accommodation would not achieve the goals of 
reconciliation intended by section 35.   
Building on the Supreme Court of Canada‘s cases and academic scholarship, this thesis argues 
that taking on a standard of consultation aiming at consent would better respect the underlying 
legal principles and thereby enhance the relationships between the Crown and Aboriginal 
peoples, and it develops some resulting implications.  
This thesis advances its argument in the particular context of the possible deployment of Small 
Modular Reactors (SMRs) on or near Aboriginal traditional territories.  This SMR context is one 
that involves new technology and a new opportunity to engage in consultation in better ways 
than may have occurred with legacy technologies. Using this context of a new technology where 
there is a chance to get things right from the outset, this thesis argues for an improved 
understanding of the duty to consult that follows the initial purposes the Supreme Court of 
Canada recognized the duty to consult as having.  On the original duty to consult case law, the 
duty to consult is supposed to promote reconciliation.  Later case law has not done so effectively.  
In other words, the thesis argues that subsequent case law has not followed properly the original 
case law and must be reordered in light of the underlying principle of reconciliation.  Doing so 
offers a distinctive understanding of the duty to consult that is neither the current understanding 
of the duty to consult nor a so-called veto (as some assume is the only alternative).   
Rather, the thesis will argue, the conception advanced is in line with a better understanding of 
what Canadian law on the duty to consult requires and with developing international norms. Both 
of those call for consultation that aims at consent.  That does not necessarily mean that all 
instance of consultation will achieve (or needs to achieve) consent.  But consultation aimed at 
consent is different than consultation as presently conceived (and results in the consideration of 
4 
 
different factors in assessing consultation) even while not amounting to a so-called veto power.  
This thesis thus tries to suggest a new way of understanding the legally standard for consultation.  
 
 1.1 Setting the Background 
At the epicentre of certain Crown decisions lies the possibility for the Crown‘s decision to have 
potential or actual adverse effects upon Aboriginal rights. For example, as it relates to some 
resource development projects, Crown decisions are critical to the physical and cultural well-
being of Aboriginal peoples. Canada‘s resource and energy development are often linked to 
encroachment on Aboriginal rights and interests, as well as Aboriginal resistance to such 
infringement. This frequently exerts pressure on Crown-Aboriginal relations. 
In various circumstances, Aboriginal peoples have claimed that the Crown has not discharged its 
obligation to consult Aboriginal groups adequately, thereby resulting in a lack of significant 
attention paid to the Aboriginal rights and/or interests.  Over the years, this sort of claim has led 
to numerous lawsuits against the Crown by Aboriginal peoples; these lawsuits have sought 
courts‘ intervention in clarifying the parameters of the duty to consult.6  Although litigation 
sometimes may be necessary, excessive litigation because of ongoing disagreement is likely to 
mar reconciliation processes. Economically, litigation has resulted in major financial losses and 
disruption of project development for Aboriginal peoples, the government, project proponents, 
and the Canadian economy.
7
    
In its more detailed elaborations, the Supreme Court has defined the government‘s legal 
responsibilities in the area of consultation and accommodation of Aboriginal communities. The 
Crown has the sole responsibility to consult with Aboriginal peoples. The government may, 
however, delegate aspects of its obligation to industry.
8
 The Court has also specified that 
accommodation will require balancing the interests of the affected Aboriginal peoples with the 
                                                          
6
 Bryn Gray, Building Relationships and Advancing Reconciliation through Meaningful Consultation, Report to the 
Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs (2016), online: <https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1498765671013/1498765827601#sec1>  (Accessed March 12, 2018) [Gray- INAC Report, 2016].  
7
Ibid.  
8
 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 53. 
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larger society.
9
 The Supreme Court‘s fuller detailing of the legal duty appears to set up the 
government to discharge its obligation merely in a manner that meets the minimum 
requirements. The government‘s overly frequent approach of working to achieve minimum 
standards of consultation and the requirement of balancing Aboriginal interests with the interests 
of the larger Canadian society together promote a very limited fufillment of the protective 
function of section 35. 
The Supreme Court‘s detailed conception of the duty to consult is largely informed by the 
common law, while factoring out Aboriginal legal principles. It is thus inconsistent with the 
underlying principle the Court had set out concerning reconciliation.  A reconciliation-oriented 
balancing approach—an approach that draws on Canadian and Aboriginal legal perspectives—
will be helpful to formulate a consultation regime for future developments as Canada endeavours 
to unlock its vast resources.  
The context of consultation related to deployment of a new technology, where patterns of 
conduct are not already established, can help show the possibilities of a return to the underlying 
principles of the duty to consult, and the thesis uses the example of SMRs for such a context.  By 
way of background, Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are unique technologies that are expected 
to supply power to smaller electrical grids or remote off-grid regions in Canada.
10
  They are 
advanced technologies that have unique features and are designed to facilitate power supply in 
areas where traditional nuclear power plants are not practicable.
11
 Globally, the call to embrace a 
clean energy system to reduce fossil fuel emissions is increasing.
12
 Canada is increasingly 
contemplating SMR development to achieve its commitment to clean energy and to reduce 
                                                          
9
 Ibid, at para 50.  
10
 Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Discussion Paper DIS-16-04, Small Modular Reactors: 
Regulatory Strategy, Approaches and Challenges, (Ottawa: CNSC, May 2016) at 1 [CNSC Discussion Paper]; N. 
Todreas, ―Small Modular Reactors for Producing Nuclear Energy: An Introduction‖ in Mario D. Carelli & T. 
Ingersoll, eds., Handbook of Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (Cambridge: Woodhead Publishing, 2015). 
[Todreas]. 
11
 CNSC Discussion Paper, ibid at 33. 
12
See generally, United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals, Helping Governments and Stakeholders Make the 
SDGs a Reality, online:<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/> (Accessed November 19, 2019); Canada 
Nuclear Laboratories, Canada Releases Summary Report on Small Modular Reactors PFEOI (October 17, 2017), 
online: < http://www.cnl.ca/en/home/news-and-publications/news-releases/2018/cnl-and-cns-launch-
international-generation-iv-and.aspx > retrieved on March 30, 2018. 
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emissions.
13
 Remote communities in Canada, which have significant Aboriginal populations, are 
contemplated as possible sites for SMR deployment. However, placement of novel power plants 
must recognize Aboriginal peoples‘ rights. It is also important to ensure that past experiences are 
factored in, ―and that there will not be any long-term legacy associated with the project for future 
generations.‖14  
There are currently very limited works addressing the impact of SMRs on Aboriginal peoples‘ 
rights.  In a survey of literature on SMRs, Kevin Hanna et al specifically stated that there is a 
need for more research in the area of SMRs‘ impacts on Aboriginal peoples, as Aboriginal 
peoples have a distinct set of constitutional rights. They wrote: 
Research addressing both the positive and negative impacts of [SMRs] on Aboriginal 
communities is almost entirely lacking. Given that Aboriginal peoples in Canada have a 
unique set of rights set out in Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, Canada‘s status 
as a signatory of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and 
the Federal Minister of Indigenous Affairs commitment to implement the declaration 
(Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2016), this represents an essential area of 
exploration if [SMRs] are going to be developed for Canada‘s energy future.15  
While this thesis advances a novel argument about the duty to consult doctrine and how best to 
understand it, it also responds to the above call.   Using SMRs as a particular context of 
deploying a novel technology where it is possible to get things right from the beginning, the 
thesis contributes to the ongoing discussion on the possible deployment of SMRs in Canada in 
relation to Aboriginal rights and the duty to consult.   Most of the limited Canadian research on 
SMRs focuses on safety, energy security, and economics. Impacts on Aboriginal and treaty rights 
are also a necessary focus for the successful advancement of the new technology.  
Much focus on SMR technology relates to offering a cleaner energy source. One area of attention 
has been remote, off-grid communities, where SMRs offer a substitute for high-cost diesel-fired 
                                                          
13
 Canadian Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Natural Resources, Nuclear Sector at a 
Crossroads: Fostering Innovation and Energy Security for Canada and the World, Report of Standing Committee 
on Natural Resources, 42 Parl., 1
st
 Sess. (June 2017) 12 (Chair: James Maloney) at 12. 
14
 SMR Roadmap Technology Working Group, Canadian SMR Roadmap: Technology Working Group Report 
(October 26, 2018) (accessed December 10, 2019) at 18 [SMR Roadmap-TWG]; Indigenous and Public Engagement 
Working Group, Canadian Small Modular Reactor Roadmap: Revised Recommendations (August 17, 2018) 
(Accessed December 20, 2019) at 2 [SMR Roadmap-IPEWG]. 
15
 Kevin Hanna et al, ―What Is Known About the Impacts of Alternative Energy Development? A Gap Analysis of 
Impact and Assessment Research for Alternative Energy Development‖, CEAR Project Report SC-16-1 (Okanagan: 
The University of British Columbia, 2016) at i, 6 [Hanna et al].  
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generators.
16
  In Canada, such communities are mostly Aboriginal-based or largely populated by 
Aboriginal groups.  While some provinces, including Saskatchewan, have been able to reach all 
or almost all communities with the electrical grid, others have not. British Columbia has the 
largest number of communities that depend largely on diesel, with fifty-seven communities 
primarily operating diesel generators.  Ontario accounts for thirty-one communities, while 
Newfoundland & Labrador, Nunavut, and Quebec account for twenty-six, twenty-five and 
twenty-four communities respectively.
17
  In Nunavut, even Iqaluit, a city of almost ten thousand 
people, is off-grid and dependent on diesel-generated electricity. These local diesel generators 
are powered with over 90 million liters of diesel every year, ―emitting 240,000 metric tons of 
CO2 and several other air contaminants in the process.‖18 SMRs can provide a unique reliable 
energy supply ―as a low greenhouse gas emission alternative for electricity generation.‖19  
Their application may extend beyond replacing diesel-generated electricity.  For example, while 
only one off-grid community in Saskatchewan is operated primarily on diesel generators, 
approximately half of Saskatchewan's energy is powered by coal, a source of energy fuel that 
involves high emissions.
20
 SMRs could help Saskatchewan to hit its carbon emission goals, 
―which would require a 40 [percent] reduction in 2005 emission levels in the next decade.‖21 
However, placement of any novel power plants must recognize Aboriginal rights and interests. 
SMRs offer unique circumstances that make their development an important opportunity for the 
Crown to go above and beyond its usual technical approach to the duty to consult. SMRs are still 
at the conceptual stage.  Therefore, they provide a unique opportunity for far earlier forms of 
engagement with Aboriginal peoples in terms of research partnerships into potential impacts and 
effects on Aboriginal peoples. Instead of presenting a particular proposal for consultation and 
                                                          
16
 Nuclear Energy Insider, Holtec, Ukraine plan to build SMRs in 2020s; Canada to publish SMR roadmap in the 
fall (March 7, 2018), online: < https://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/ > (Accessed March 31, 2018) [NEI-
Holtec].   
17
 SMR Roadmap-TWG, supra note 14 at 100. 
18
 Jorge Morales Pedraza, ―Benefits of Small Modular Reactors‖, in Jorge Morales Pedraza, Small Modular 
Reactors for Electricity Generation: An Economic and Technologically Sound Alternative (Vienna: Springer, 2017) 
at 145 [Pedraza]. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 SMR Roadmap-TWG, supra note 14 at 100. 
21
 Jason Warick , CBC News  Saskatchewan, Premier Scott Moe signs agreement with 2 other premiers to develop 
scalable nuclear technology (December 2, 2019) [Premier Scott Moe Signs Agreement]. 
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accommodation, Aboriginal peoples could be proactively engaged at the research and 
development stage.  
This thesis does not apply to SMRs uniquely.  However, they are an interesting example of a 
future development, which provides an opportunity to reassess and improve the role of the duty 
to consult in promoting mutual relationships between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. 
 
1.2  Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into five chapters.  The introductory chapter 1 has briefly set up the 
intended argument. A short appendage to this chapter after the present outline contains a 
literature review aimed at showing how this thesis will make innovative arguments that 
contribute to what has already been done.  
Chapter 2 very briefly reviews the fundamentals of SMRs and the potential impact of SMRs on 
Aboriginal peoples.  It sets out, in more detail, the potential Aboriginal interests that may be 
impacted in the course of setting up the nuclear technology and during its operation in the 
context of Aboriginal peoples in Saskatchewan. These likely impacts include taking up of 
Aboriginal traditional lands, impacts on water bodies which may restrict Aboriginal peoples 
from the continuous exercise of their fishing rights, and restrictions of movement in exclusion 
zones. It shows some of the resulting requirements of the future duty to consult doctrine in the 
context of a technology presently in ongoing development.  
Chapter 3 sets out more fully the background for the duty to consult and accommodate in a 
broader context and then examines its application in the context of a future development, such as 
SMRs. It traces the principled origin and the now-legalistic requirements of the duty to consult. 
This chapter also briefly summarizes the emerging norms of the UNDRIP and highlights the 
Canadian perspective on these international norms.  
Chapter 4 discusses at some length the reconciliation case law from the Supreme Court of 
Canada.  It briefly references other theories of reconciliation in order to situate the account of 
reconciliation in the case law. This thesis adopts the Supreme Court‘s long-standing account of 
reconciliation from Van der Peet – ―the reconciliation of pre-existing Aboriginal societies with 
9 
 
the assertion of Crown sovereignty.‖22 This thesis approaches the question of reconciliation in 
the context of McLachlin J.‘s conception expressed in that case and accepted in later cases. 
Consistent with the view of McLachlin J. (as she then was), this thesis argues that the 
legal perspectives of both non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal societies ―must be incorporated and the 
common law being applied must give full recognition to the pre-existing [A]boriginal tradition‖ 
to achieve reconciliation.
23
 This account of reconciliation should continue to influence the duty 
to consult.  Chapter 4 discusses why the current duty to consult does not meet the standards that 
would flow from reconciliation, thus putting the legalistic form of the duty to consult at odds 
with its principled origins.   
 Chapter 5 discusses at some length the international norm of FPIC and why that might have 
bearing on Canadian duty to consult case law.  It discusses how there can be a concept of 
consultation aiming at consent that differs from the current duty to consult and also differs from 
an obligation to obtain consent (or what is sometimes called a ―veto power‖).  The chapter 
explores ways in which the law could further a concept of consultation aiming at consent and the 
application of such a standard in particular scenarios: judicial development of revised approaches 
considering factors that seek to assess whether consultation was aimed at consent, seeking to 
clearly guide improved consultation practices so as to avoid ongoing litigation; government co-
development of consultation policies and practices with Aboriginal peoples; and improved 
practices in securing Aboriginal approval through negotiated agreements.   
 
1.3 Existing Scholarship on the Duty to Consult 
Under Canadian law, Aboriginal peoples have a recognized set of rights enshrined in Section 
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.  The duty to consult and accommodate is central to the 
protection of Aboriginal peoples‘ rights in Canada.24 The Crown‘s obligation to consult 
Aboriginal peoples has been viewed by some scholars, notably in the prominent work of Dwight 
                                                          
22
 Mikisew Cree, 2018, supra note 2. 
23
 Van der Peet, supra note 4 at para 35. 
24
 See Haida Nation, supra note 1. 
10 
 
Newman, as a positive response which addresses the past imbalances of power and curbs 
unilateral state action that may have severe impacts on Aboriginal peoples.
25
   
There have been many significant developments around the duty to consult, yet novel questions 
keep emerging. Authors in addition to Newman, such as Thomas Isaac
26
 and Jack Woodward,
27
 
have engaged in various studies on the duty to consult. Most of these scholars, however, have 
focused on general clarifications of the existing law. 
Newman
28
 and Isaac
29
 both examine the duty to consult doctrinally. Newman explains the duty 
to consult as a constitutional duty. He provides insight on some approaches to understanding the 
duty to consult and suggests possible influence on the future directions of the legal doctrine.  
Isaac gives a comprehensive study on the impact of Canadian law on Aboriginal peoples. He 
considers when the duty to consult is triggered, to whom the duty applies, and underscores the 
role of the Crown in reconciliation of Aboriginal interests with the Canadian society. Having 
been published in 2014 and 2016 respectively, these books are, however, increasingly dated. 
They do not cover the current relevant cases on duty to consult,
30
 Canada‘s present position on 
the United Nations Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),
31
 or obviously 
anything specific to the duty to consult in the context of new technologies like SMRs.  They do 
not cover studies on the CNSC‘s polices for Aboriginal consultation in the nuclear industry. In a 
more recent work, Dwight Newman
32
 traced the development of the duty to consult at a doctrinal 
level. He highlights the complexities around the jurisprudence of the duty to consult and the 
present and future challenges for the legal doctrine, but he remains grounded in present doctrine.  
                                                          
25
 Dwight Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2014) at 15 
[Newman 2014]. 
26
 Thomas Isaac, Aboriginal Law, 5th edn. (Canada: Thomson Reuter Canada, 2016) [Isaac]. 
27
 Jack Woodward, Native Law (Toronto: Thomson Reuter Canada, 2011). 
28
 Newman 2014, supra note 25 at 25. 
29
 Isaac, supra note 26. 
30
 See for example, the relevant cases of Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge Pipelines Inc., [2017] 1 
SCR 1099, 2017 SCC 41. [Chippewas of the Thames]; Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., [2017] 
1 SCR 1069, 2017 SCC 40. [Clyde River].  In these cases, the Curt determined that the Crown may fulfill its duty to 
consult through a government agency conferred with the authority to do so.  
31
 United Nations Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples, U.N.G.A. GA Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295. (Sept. 13, 2007), (2007), 46 I.L.M. 1013 [UNDRIP] 
32
 Dwight Newman, ―The Section 35 Duty to Consult‖ in Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers, ed, 
The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017) 349 [Newman-The 
Oxford Handbook]. 
11 
 
Other scholars have offered critiques of the duty to consult doctrine as not sufficiently protective 
of Aboriginal peoples‘ rights. They have explored the values and limitations of the legal 
doctrine. Gordon Christie, for example, has written critiques on the duty to consult that are 
different from those offered in this thesis.
33
 Christie examines court efforts to justify the ―taking 
up‖ of lands by the government while simultaneously asserting Crown sovereignty over 
Aboriginal groups. He presents a different perspective that offers a foundation to build upon. 
Christie‘s argument is centered on what he perceives as a collaboration between the Court and 
the Crown to maintain a continuous colonial project. He looks at the power within the 
jurisprudence of the duty to consult from a colonial perspective.
34
 He sees the duty to consult as 
―an assimilation tool, a link in the continuing chain of colonial jurisprudence.‖35  Christie‘s work 
looks more at the formulation of the duty, while this thesis extends to the implementation of the 
legal duty. Authors like Kaitlin Ritchie, Rachel Ariss, Clara MacCallum Fraser, and Diba 
Nazneen Somani have in their works identified a number of limitations that pose serious threats 
to implementing the duty to consult and achieving the goal of reconciliation.
36
 Ritchie identifies 
three areas of risks (delegation, capacity, and cumulative effect of consultation) that limit the 
meaningfulness of consultation and the realization of reconciliation. This thesis builds on such 
work in novel ways. 
The courts have held that the goal of the duty to consult is to facilitate the reconciliation 
process.
37
 On this, Mark Walters has argued for seeing reconciliation as a component of legality. 
He examines the use of the concept of reconciliation in the legal discussion on the rights of 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada.
38
  But he does not apply this to the duty to consult doctrine. 
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 Mikisew Cree, 2018, supra note 3 at para 61.    
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Bashir, eds., The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
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However, growing international legal practice interacts with the Canadian duty to consult in 
some ways. The Canadian government, notably, has made known its commitment to fostering a 
harmonious Crown-Aboriginal relationship by declaring full support of the UNDRIP, thus 
making the body of work on these international norms all the more pertinent. There is a 
significant number of research on the UNDRIP which aims to protect Indigenous peoples‘ rights 
globally—for example, works by Xanthaki,39 Anaya,40 Joffe,41 and Doyle.42  The UNDRIP has 
been viewed as a comprehensive regime that protects Indigenous peoples' right to their 
traditional territories against states‘ unilateral action.43 The UNDRIP provides, inter alia, for 
Indigenous peoples‘ rights to free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC). Doyle contextualizes the 
FPIC requirement in the view of Indigenous historical sovereignty.
44
 He states that FPIC is not at 
odds with development or sincere public interest, but ―complementary to them and necessary for 
their inclusive and non-discriminatory realization.‖45 Anaya states that FPIC should not be 
perceived as Indigenous peoples having general veto rights over states‘ decisions.46 He argues 
that the objective of consultation should be to obtain Indigenous peoples‘ consent while 
―avoiding imposition of the will of one party over the other‖47 This thesis relies on a 
characterization of FPIC like that offered by Doyle
48
 and Anaya
49
  to argue that FPIC does not 
contemplate a general veto-right over state decisions, especially if the impact of the proposed 
state activity will not be profound. FPIC, on this conception, is a requirement that states should 
consult with Indigenous peoples in good faith with the aim to reach an agreement before 
proceeding with a project, particularly when a proposed development is capable of affecting 
Indigenous peoples‘ rights.  
                                                          
39
 Alexandra Xanthaki, ―Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years and Future Developments‖ 
(2009) 10 Melbourne J Int‘l L 27 [Xanthaki].   
40
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
People, James Anaya, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34, 15 July 2009 [Anaya Report, 2009]. 
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with Genuine Reconciliation‖ (2010) 26 NJCL 121 [Joffe 2010]. See also Michelle Biddulph & Dwight Newman, 
―A Contextualized Account of General Principles of International Law‖ (2014) 26 Pace Int‘l L Rev 286; Fons 
Coomans, ―The Ogoni Case Before the African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights‖ (2003) 52 ICLQ 749. 
42
 Cathal M. Doyle, Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territories, Rights and Resources: The Transformative Role of 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent (London: Routledge, 2015) [Doyle]. 
43
 Xanthaki, supra note 39 at 31; Joffe 2010, supra note 41 at 145.  
44
 Doyle, supra note 42 at 4.  
45
 Ibid, at 6.  
46
 Anaya Report, 2009, supra note 40 at para 46. 
47
 Doyle, supra note 42 at 149. 
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This research attempts to enlarge on the above literature in discussing the Crown‘s legal 
obligation to consult, using the example of proposed SMR projects.  This thesis essentially builds 
on the views set forth by Newman, Isaac, Christie, Woodward, Walters,
50
 and other scholars 
while offering a novel take on the duty to consult. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
50
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Chapter 2: Example of SMRs as a Future Development Engaging the Duty to Consult 
2.0 Introduction  
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) has employed the Risk-Informed Decision 
Making (RIDM) model in assessing nuclear activities. The Commission has used the risk-
informed approach to assess risks at the licensing and decision-making stages. The RIDM 
process offers information on the risks of nuclear activities on the environment and recommends 
measures to control the risks. The RIDM addresses all the significant risks related to any issue 
that supports ―decisions in areas of licensing, compliance, and planning and resource allocation.‖ 
Apart from safety issues, ―other sources of risks, related to the CNSC mandate and objectives, 
including environmental and organizational risks, are also accounted for in the decision-making 
process.‖51 It is in line with the CNSC approach that this chapter proceeds to explore the 
potential impacts of SMRs on Aboriginal peoples. 
This chapter reviews the fundamentals of SMRs and some potential impacts of SMRs on 
Aboriginal peoples.  It sets out, in more detail, the potential Aboriginal interests that may be 
impacted in the course of deploying SMRs and during their operation in the context of 
Aboriginal peoples in Saskatchewan. These likely impacts include taking up of Aboriginal 
traditional lands, impacts on water bodies which may restrict Aboriginal peoples from the 
continuous exercise of Aboriginal fishing rights, and restriction of movement from the excluded 
zone. The chapter thus sets up an example of the future duty to consult doctrine in the context of 
a technology presently in ongoing development—because the duty to consult applies to potential 
infringements, it will end up needing to apply to SMR deployment. 
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 A. Bujor, G. Rzentkowski & D. Miller, ―Development of Risk-Informed Regulatory Positions on Candu Safety 
Issues, Part I: Methodology Development for Risk Estimation and Evaluation‖ (2010),, in International Atomic 
Energy Association (IAEA), Good Practices in Heavy Water Reactor Operation (IAEA: Vienna, Australia 2010) 
IAEA-TECDOC-1650 at 25. 
15 
 
2.1 Fundamentals of Small Modular Reactors     
SMRs are advanced nuclear power plants that can be constructed in factories and transported to 
deployment sites for installation.
52
 There is no universal meaning for the term SMR. The 
acronym also differs as it may stand for small modular reactors, small and medium reactors, and 
small and medium modular reactors.
53
 Generally, ―SMRs‖ refers to nuclear reactors generating 
power of less than 700 MWe.  Unlike conventional/large nuclear plants that generate a range of 
700 MWe and above, small rectors generate power below 300 MWe, while medium reactors 
generate between 300 – 700 MWe.54  Different types of nuclear reactors have been used for 
medical purposes, for material testing research purposes, and power generation.
55
  
In recent years SMRs have been attracting significant attention globally because of increasing 
concerns related to energy supply security and the urgent need to mitigate climate change.
56
 
Designers of SMR technologies aim for substantial ―cost reduction through modularization 
and… shorter construction schedule than… larger nuclear power plants.‖57 The International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) outlined the driving forces in the development of SMRs: 
―meeting the need for flexible power generation for wider range of users and applications; 
replacing the aging fossil fuel-fired power plants; enhancing safety performance through inherent 
and passive safety features; offering better upfront capital cost affordability; suitability for 
cogeneration and non-electric applications; options for remote regions with less developed 
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infrastructures; and offering possibilities for synergetic hybrid energy systems that combine 
nuclear and alternate energy sources, including renewables.‖58  
Presently there has been a significant advancement in SMRs, with approximately 50 SMR 
concepts and designs under various stages of construction.  Dozens of these reactors are claimed 
to be close to the deployment stage.
59
 Notably, Russia, China, and Argentina have demonstration 
power plants which are at advanced stages. The Russian Federation‘s KLT-40s, which is a 
design based on a third generation KLT-40 marine propulsion plant, is an advanced version of a 
reactor developed for a floating nuclear power plant (FNPP) to provide the capacity of 35 
MW(e) per module.
60
 China is equally building the HTR-PM reactor, which is a high-
temperature gas-cooled reactor pebble-bed module, and the ACP100 design.
61
  In Argentina, the 
Central Argentina de Elementos Modular (CAREM-25) which has a thermal power of 100MW 
((30MW (e)), is under construction.
62
 After these demonstration projects move to commercial 
development, the initial commercial fleet of SMRs is projected to begin operation between 2025 
and 2030.
63
 
In Canada, different vendors are suggesting SMRs as an alternative to high-cost diesel-fired 
generators.
64
 There were 80 responses from across Canada and around the world comprising 
reactor developers, suppliers or service providers, academic/research organizations, communities 
and individuals, and potential-end users indicating interest in the Canadian nuclear laboratories‘ 
(CNL) Request for Expression of Interest (RFEOI).
65
 The RFEOI also generated 18 design 
proposals, out of which 8 have a capacity between 0 to 15 MW.
66
 Having declared SMRs as one 
of its seven strategic initiatives, CNL is expected to deploy a demonstration SMR plant on its 
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Chalk River sites by 2026. It is uncertain the number of different SMR designs that are presently 
being constructed, the CNSC, however, is reviewing twelve different models of SMR.
67
  
SMR may be attractive for the province of Saskatchewan. Recently, the Saskatchewan Premier 
signed a memorandum of understanding with Ontario and New Brunswick Premier to support 
the commitment to work together on the development and placement of SMRs. The Premier 
highlighted the importance of the province meeting the emission-free goal, respecting the federal 
government‘s desire to eliminate the use of ―coal-fired‖ power generators by 2030. This is very 
important for Saskatchewan, especially, as it relies heavily on coal-fired plants.
68
  SMRs could 
help Saskatchewan to hit its carbon emission goals, ―which would require a 40 [percent] 
reduction in 2005 emission levels in the next decade.‖69 
 
2.2 Potential Impacts of SMR Operation on Aboriginal Peoples’ Rights 
This section discusses in general terms some possible impacts of SMR deployment in the context 
of Saskatchewan and the resulting duty to consult obligations on a conventional understanding of 
the legal doctrine.  It identifies some of the Aboriginal interests that could be affected during the 
deployment and operation of SMRs. It argues that the placement of SMRs will most likely 
trigger the Crown‘s duty to consult given the potential impact of SMR operations, such as taking 
up of Aboriginal land, impact on water bodies and Aboriginal fishing rights, and restriction of 
movement from the excluded zone around each SMR. 
Despite the potential benefits of nuclear technology, SMRs may negatively impact Aboriginal 
peoples‘ rights in various ways.  Saskatchewan is under Treaties 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10.70 By the 
terms of Treaties 4, 5, 8, and 10, Aboriginal peoples retain the rights to continue their traditional 
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vocations of hunting, trapping, and fishing. It is not certain if such privileges could be exercised 
under treaty 2 as the Crown made only an oral commitment to the exercise of these rights.
71
   
It is important to mention that the Natural Resource Transfer Agreement Act (NRTA) aims to 
protect the continuous exercise of Aboriginal peoples‘ right to hunting, trapping, and fishing.72 
The Court held in Moosehunter that the NRTA has the ―effect of merging and consolidating the 
treaty rights of the Indians in the area and restricting the power of the provinces to regulate the 
Indians‘ right to hunt for food. The right of Indians to hunt for sport or commercially could be 
regulated by provincial game laws but the right to hunt for food could not.‖73 While the NRTA 
restricts the right to hunt for commercial purpose, it substantially expanded the area within which  
those Aboriginal persons who are members of First Nations in Saskatchewan  can hunt for food. 
Further, as a result of the NRTA, the Supreme Court in R. v. Horseman
74
 explained that the 
method used by Aboriginal peoples to hunt for food is out of the scope of provincial 
governments. Whereas other hunters may not have the right to hunt at every season of the year or 
all types of game they may want to kill, First Nations individuals are not subject to these 
limitations. They can hunt at every season and can kill any species.
75
 In essence, the NRTA 
expanded both the area of Aboriginal hunting and the means of hunting. It also restricts the 
jurisdiction of provincial governments to regulate the right of hunting for food. 
In considering SMR deployment, the Crown needs to consider the impacts of rights held under 
these treaties.  Significantly, the treaty rights issues that will be addressed include the issue of 
disturbance of some areas of land for the construction of SMRs, impingement and entailment, 
and thermal effluent. In addition, the increase in demand for water necessary for cooling SMRs 
will increase stresses on water sources.
76
 Storage and transportation of spent fuel and nuclear 
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waste to the repository site may also become an issue that may implicate treaty rights.
77
 Other 
issues that require consideration include the risks attendant to any incident at an SMR, even if 
various factors are meant to make these particularly unlikely in the operation of an SMR.   
 
2.2.1 Taking Up Aboriginal Traditional Lands  
The siting of SMRs would include taking up of land and disturbance of tracts of land where 
SMRs are sited. The small size of SMRs and their modularity offer unique deployment options. 
SMRs could be deployed in large numbers or as a single reactor.
78
 Where a single SMR is 
deployed, it may present little or no impact as it will require only a small area of land. 
Deployment of SMR as multiple reactors in a fleet, though, may require taking up large areas of 
land and could significantly impact on Aboriginal peoples‘ treaty rights. Similarly, construction 
of power lines that will transmit electricity from the power plant to the end users may also 
impact Aboriginal peoples‘ treaty rights. 
In Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources),
79
 the Court held that 
the Crown may take up land under treaty. The power to take up land is not unconditional and 
must be exercised in conformity with the honour of the Crown.
80
 The Crown‘s authority to take 
up lands covered by treaty is burdened by the Crown‘s duty to consult and, if appropriate, 
accommodate Aboriginal peoples‘ interests beforehand.81 
Where the Crown contemplates taking up lands for implementing a project, the Crown must 
consider the impact the project could have on the exercise of Aboriginal peoples‘ rights to hunt, 
fish and trap, and it must inform affected Aboriginal peoples of its findings.
82
 The Crown ―must 
then deal with the [affected Aboriginal peoples] in good faith, and with the intention of 
substantially addressing‖ their concerns.83 Moreover, the negative impact of the Crown‘s 
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decision is subject to the degree of the impact, but then consultation must not ignore 
accommodation from the onset.  
It is not every taking up by the Crown that constitutes an infringement of Aboriginal traditional 
harvesting rights set out in a treaty.
84
 In Mikisew Cree, the court held that ―taking up land for a 
purpose expressed or necessarily implied in a treaty itself cannot be considered an infringement‖ 
of treaty rights.
85
 However, if taking up so much land will leave Aboriginal peoples with ―no 
meaningful right to hunt, fish or trap in relation to the territories over which they traditionally 
hunted, fished, and trapped, a potential action for treaty infringement will arise‖86 
Taking up of land for the deployment of SMRs may limit Aboriginal peoples‘ treaty rights, such 
as through an infringement on treaty rights to fish, hunt, or trap.  The potential diminution in the 
quantity of the harvest of wildlife and the ―fragmentation of wildlife habitat, disruption of 
migration patterns, loss of vegetation, increased poaching because of easier motor vehicle access 
to the area and increased wildlife mortality due to motor vehicle collisions‖ was held in Mikisew, 
also in a treaty context, to be enough to trigger the duty to consult.
87
 Thus, it appears that a 
proposed placement of an SMR or fleet of SMRs and subsequent operation could adversely 
affect Aboriginal hunting and trapping treaty rights and could then trigger the constitutional duty 
to consult. 
 
2.2.2 Potential Impacts of Operation on Water Bodies and Aboriginal Fishing Rights 
The operation of some models of SMRs will require a significant amount of water to cool reactor 
cores and then involve the transfer of the warm waste into water bodies.  Some advocates of 
SMRs claim that SMRs will need less water compared to traditional power plants.
88
 As stated 
above, SMR deployment could require a ―‗fleet‘ based approach‖ for standardized operations 
and benefits from reduced capital costs.
89
 Where SMRs that use water for cooling are deployed 
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in large numbers, they will need higher water withdrawal levels than the traditional plant.
90
 
Water intakes and discharges from nuclear plants expel heat into the atmosphere and nearby 
water bodies, which result in thermal pollution, affecting the ―aquatic food web from benthic 
organisms‖ to plankton and fish.91 This process of water intake and withdrawal is believed to 
harm fish by ―physical disturbances, impingement and entrainment92, and thermal effects.‖93 The 
drawing of water for SMR activities may have some potential adverse impacts on Aboriginal 
peoples‘ treaty rights to fishing and trapping rights, thereby requiring that the Crown consult the 
potentially affected Aboriginal peoples.  
Approving operating licenses to SMRs developers can affect Aboriginal fishing rights, and the 
Crown will have to consult the affected Aboriginal peoples on that issue. The Crown is required 
to consider and address the impacts of its decision to issue licenses to proponents may have on 
Aboriginal fishing rights protected under section 35.  The drawing of water for SMR operations 
may amount to infringement if it is considered to have significant effects on Aboriginal peoples‘ 
exercise of their constitutionally protected rights to fish.
94
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2.2.3 Exclusion Zone for SMRs 
SMRs may need exclusion zones (designed barriers) to avoid accidental discharge of substantial 
radioactivity in the event of a nuclear incident.
95
 SMR exclusion zones may require a radius 
ranging from 0.4 km to 0.8 km for 50MWe and 300MWe reactors respectively.
96
  Nuclear 
reactors may also be buried underground or confined in a container. Where this is the case, the 
radius for the exclusion zone may be reduced or may not be needed at all. Further study is 
needed to ―develop a method to account for the effect of such an enclosure on the size of the 
exclusion zone.‖97 The exclusion area will be under the complete management of the licensee, 
restricting all activities within the area. The existence of such an exclusion zone will likely limit 
Aboriginal groups from exercising their rights such as have been mentioned earlier. 
It is said that burying reactors underground aims to reduce the magnitude of danger that may 
occur in the event of a natural disaster or other incidents, but this could itself create a different 
problem. For example, it could increase the chances of contaminating water underground and 
make the recovery of radioactive materials or waste complicated.
98
 
 
2.2.4 Nuclear Waste  
One of the critical issues that needs to be factored in during the decision-making process for the 
placement of SMRs is the issue of management of nuclear waste generated from SMR operation. 
Even though the management of nuclear waste is somewhat different from the development of 
SMR, the operation of SMRs will produce nuclear waste, and the management of this radioactive 
waste is one of the environmental concerns correlated to nuclear power which needs to be 
considered seriously.  
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 It is believed that SMRs will likely produce lesser quantities of radioactive waste ―per unit of 
electricity generated‖ than the traditional plant.99 However, several models of SMRs can be 
constructed and deployed to operate with various generators in many different sites. This means 
that SMRs could generate spent fuel in various locations, resulting in more challenges in 
recovering or managing spent fuel than anticipated.
100
 Saskatchewan may need to set up 
structures for the management of nuclear waste: it will need to construct a temporary repository 
site before it could be transported to a permanent site if it has no permanent site. 
The choice of the repository site for nuclear waste will require that some designated areas be 
restricted, having the potential to implicate Aboriginal rights, and so limiting Aboriginal peoples 
from pursuing the negotiated course within the restricted areas. At its worst, there could be a 
release of radioactive material during the transportation of used fuel, with lasting and harmful 
results such as contaminated soils, water, and vegetation.
101
 Although this has been described as 
unlikely to occur, there is a need to consider it.  
 
2.2.5 Uranium Mining 
Although remotely related to the deployment of SMRs, uranium has been described as having a 
significant link with SMRs as it would serve as a source of fuel.
102
 Increased uranium mining in 
Canada may be anticipated, with SMR operations possibly reviving the dropping fortunes of the 
industry.
103
 This means an increase in the amount of uranium mining in Saskatchewan.  
It is crucial, however, to mention that going by Canadian court decisions, any alleged potential 
adverse impacts arising from a possible increase in uranium mining relating to SMRs do not bear 
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on consultation on SMR siting, as they would appear to fall in the category of remote, 
speculative impacts. The Crown‘s duty to consult will not arise until there is a non-speculative 
impact on rights.
104
 The claim must be more than a ―speculative impact‖ of governmental 
conduct before the duty to consult is triggered. The potentially affected Aboriginal groups need 
to ―show a causal relationship between the proposed government conduct or decision and a 
potential for adverse impacts on pending Aboriginal claims or rights.‖105 An assertion based on 
mere speculative or non-appreciable impacts will not meet the requirement.
106
 There must be an 
―apprehended, evidence-based potential or possible impact on Aboriginal rights‖ concerning 
SMRs,
107
 and there must be an immediate connection between the possible adverse effects and 
the contemplated Crown conduct.
108
 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
Despite their constructive prospects, SMRs may adversely affect treaty rights in many ways. 
Some of the potential impacts include taking up of Aboriginal traditional lands in ways affecting 
hunting rights, thermal pollution on water bodies and resulting impacts on Aboriginal fishing 
rights, and restriction of movement from the excluded zone around each SMR. These impacts 
could affect Aboriginal treaty rights and thus would trigger the duty to consult. On standard rules 
on the duty to consult, there would be a duty to consult concerning these impacts.  
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Chapter 3: Consultation and Accommodation 
 
3.0 Introduction 
The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that section 35 provides a constitutional basis for ―the 
reconciliation of the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.‖109  
In later cases, notably on the duty to consult, it has continuously stated that section 35 of the 
constitution aims to foster the ―reconciliation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians in a 
mutually respectful long-term relationship.‖110  
The duty to consult is a major aspect of the goal of reconciliation of Aboriginal peoples and the 
Crown/non-Aboriginal society.  The Supreme Court of Canada sets out the doctrine of duty to 
consult and accommodate in relation to developments which may have possible adverse effects 
on Aboriginal or treaty rights. In view of that, Canada has established policies and guidelines 
designed to address Aboriginal peoples‘ concerns in keeping with the Crown‘s legal duty.   
The duty to consult endeavours to enforce the honour of the Crown, a concept that is based on 
the principle that the Crown, in exercise of the duty to consult, should refrain from ―sharp 
dealing‖ and act honourably at every stage. The duty to consult has progressively developed, 
requiring the Crown to relate with Aboriginal peoples in keeping with honourable conduct.
111
 
As a legal doctrine, the duty to consult connects in many ―significant ways with all of the 
questions about resource development and its possibilities for Aboriginal Canadians.‖112 The 
duty to consult protects Aboriginal peoples‘ fundamental interests. Consultation processes 
provide Canadian Aboriginal groups with protections for Aboriginal and treaty rights when 
Crown decisions may adversely affect these rights, ―while asking Canadian governments always 
to be more engaged with Aboriginal issues.‖113 Consultation processes function to ensure prior 
assessment of all possible negative effects of the proposed development on Aboriginal land, as 
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well as the level of such impact on their Aboriginal rights and interests, and possible 
accommodation measures where appropriate. 
Nevertheless, to many Aboriginal peoples, resource project development often fits uneasily into 
Aboriginal peoples‘ determination to protect their rights and traditional territory.  In many cases, 
there have been concerns about the level of engagement with Aboriginal peoples in decision-
making before carrying on these projects.  According to Bryn Gray, many Aboriginal peoples 
view ―Canada's approach as largely a one-size-fits-all box-ticking exercise that fails to 
meaningfully address their concerns and relies too heavily on industry proponents and regulatory 
processes.‖114  As practised, the duty to consult does not fulfill its principled underlying 
purposes.  This chapter traces the development of the legalistic rules on the duty to consult, 
setting up the possibility of a different approach to the duty to consult more geared to 
reconciliation. 
 
3.1 Evolution of the Duty to Consult: from Haida Nation to Chippewas 
Following the prior Supreme Court of Canada cases of R v Sparrow
115
 and Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia
116
 where the Court mentioned consultation as part of the infringement analysis, 
the Court‘s discussion of the duty to consult doctrine appeared in a trilogy of cases in 2004 and 
2005.
117
  This trilogy expounded the constitutional duty of the Crown to consult and 
accommodate Aboriginal peoples, based on the honour of the Crown and the implications of 
section 35.
118
  The Supreme Court in these cases formulated a legal doctrine of duty to consult 
and, where appropriate, accommodate Aboriginal peoples‘ rights.119 The 2004 decisions in 
Haida Nation and Taku River set out the Crown‘s obligation to consult on decisions that may 
adversely impact Aboriginal rights. The 2005 case of Mikisew Cree further extended the doctrine 
to treaty rights. Based on these cases, the Crown has the duty to consult Aboriginal peoples 
―when the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of the 
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Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect the right in 
question.‖120  
Since the 2004-05 trilogy, the Supreme Court of Canada has decided additional cases that have 
added additional legal rules concerning the application of the duty to consult, such as Rio Tinto 
on consultation by administrative boards,
121
 Little Salmon on consultation in the context of a 
modern treaty,
122
 and Behn v Moulton Contracting on who is consulted.
123
  The relatively recent 
2017 cases of Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames engaged significantly with what will 
amount to the discharge of meaningful consultation.
124
 
The decisions in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames provide important understandings on 
what the courts will consider amounts to the discharge of the Crown‘s obligations. In these cases, 
the Court considered whether the Crown could rely on decision-making processes carried out by 
Canada‘s National Energy Board (NEB) to fulfill its duty. Although the Supreme Court reached 
different conclusions on whether the Crown‘s duty to consult had been discharged in the 
circumstances of the two cases, the Court concluded that the Crown may fulfill the legal duty 
through an administrative body or a regulatory agency (for example, the licensing process of the 
CNSC and the environmental assessment process of the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Agency), provided the agency is vested with the statutory authority to carry out what the duty to 
consult requires in the particular circumstances.
125
 While the decisions relied largely on already 
established legal principles, they provide useful insight into the ability of the government to 
discharge the Crown‘s obligation through relying on regulatory processes.126 The decisions also 
provide clarity for regulatory processes that will not satisfy the Crown‘s consultation obligations; 
for example, relying solely on a general environmental assessment process would not typically 
discharge the duty to consult and accommodate. It is important to consider the asserted 
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Aboriginal and treaty rights and interests and accommodate them where appropriate. In terms of 
procedure, a document dump would not suffice.
127
 
 
3.2 The Scope of the Duty to Consult 
Once it is determined that the duty to consult is triggered by the Crown‘s contemplated action, 
the Crown takes further steps to ascertain the content and scope of consultation required and, 
where appropriate, provide accommodation. The Supreme Court, per McLachlin C.J.C. though, 
advised that the concept of a spectrum does not imply a rigid legal compartment but is based on 
particular circumstances.
128
 Every case should be approached flexibly and individually in that 
consultation may disclose novel information requiring a change in the level of consultation.
129
    
 
To that end, the Crown is required to act in good faith in all cases to ensure that there has been 
meaningful consultation in particular circumstances. The Supreme Court of Canada in Haida 
Nation put forward a spectrum-based description:  
At one end of the spectrum lie cases where the claim to title is weak, the Aboriginal right 
limited, or the potential for infringement minor.  In such cases, the only duty on the 
Crown may be to give notice, disclose information, and discuss any issues raised in 
response to the notice.
130
   
 
At the other end of the spectrum lie cases where a strong prima facie case for the claim is 
established, the right and potential infringement is of high significance to the Aboriginal 
peoples, and the risk of non-compensable damage is high.  In such cases, deep 
consultation, aimed at finding a satisfactory interim solution, may be required.
131
 
 
Where a duty to consult exists, a duty to accommodate is expected, but it is not required in every 
instance.
132
 Accommodation includes taking steps to avoid severe harm, mitigating, or 
minimizing the effects of a proposed activity on Aboriginal rights.
 133 
Essentially the court has 
held that meaningful consultation may reveal a duty to accommodate, especially where there 
exist established rights or a strong prima facie claim for Aboriginal rights or title and the 
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consequences of the proposed decision may have significant adverse impacts on these asserted or 
established rights.
134
 Accommodation involves balancing Aboriginal concerns with the possible 
impact that the specific government decision may have on those Aboriginal concerns and with 
competing public concerns.
135
 However, accommodation or modification of activities has been 
criticised as being lop-sided as it is essentially dominated by the Crown vision of land use.
136
 
 
3.3 Aboriginal Consent 
Throughout its enunciation of these legal rules over the years, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
reiterated that section 35 guarantees only a process and not a particular outcome, thus, 
Aboriginal claimants cannot advance ―absolute claims‖.137 Additionally, Aboriginal peoples are 
expected to set out their claims clearly to facilitate the implementation of the duty to consult.
138
 
The duty to consult therefore creates only an opportunity for Aboriginal peoples to present their 
concerns regarding potential impacts of development on their Aboriginal rights and treaty rights 
for consideration. Where appropriate, accommodation measures will be provided to mitigate 
potential impacts on Aboriginal rights or treaty rights. The duty to consult gives no right to a 
veto and requires no Aboriginal consent prior to carrying out a project.
139
 The court held in 
Haida that ―consent is appropriate only in cases of established rights, and then by no means in 
every case.‖140 The Court has subsequently recognized that Aboriginal consent is required where 
Aboriginal title is established, but the Crown still reserves the power to unilaterally infringe 
established rights.  In effect, the legal rules set out on the duty to consult do not preclude the 
Crown from proceeding with a project where Aboriginal peoples withhold their consent.
141
  
In this, the legal rules appear, in effect, to give the Crown leeway to approach consultation 
processes in a manner just reaching the minimal requirements. This result of the legal rules is at 
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odds with the deeper realities at issue.  No matter the outcome of a consultation process, the 
Crown‘s approach to the consultation has a major role to play in building a mutual Crown-
Aboriginal relation that is beneficial to both the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. Moreover, the 
need to support reconciliation requires the Crown to conduct itself with honour in relation to 
Aboriginal peoples. Where the underlying principles were that a purposive interpretation of the 
honour of the Crown is important to promote the ongoing process of reconciliation,
142
 the 
minimalist approach to the duty to consult set out in the various legal rules ends up in a different 
spot. 
 
3.4 International Standard for Consultation  
The future development of Canada‘s duty to consult cannot be discussed without reference to the 
standard of consultation in international law since the Canadian duty to consult has significant 
interactions with the international law norms.
143
 There are a plethora of international legal 
instruments that safeguard the rights of Indigenous peoples,
144
 some of which incorporate the 
principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC). The International Labour Organization‘s 
Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries of 1989 (―ILO 
169‖)145 and UNDRIP146 are the underpinning international instruments embodying FPIC in 
connection with rights of Indigenous peoples under international law. While the ILO officially 
introduced the principle of FPIC to protect Aboriginal peoples‘ rights from unnecessary removal 
from their traditional lands,
147
 the UNDRIP is ultimately the most significant international 
instrument that protects the rights of Indigenous peoples.
148
 The UNDRIP affirms existing 
Indigenous peoples‘ rights; it does not create new or special rights for Indigenous peoples. In 
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certain technical terms, this international instrument is perceived as not being legally binding 
unless it is implemented by domestic laws. The UNDRIP, however, could provide an important 
context for courts in interpreting domestic laws.   
 
The FPIC elements in the UNDRIP fundamentally seek to ensure that Indigenous peoples‘ rights 
are protected. The FPIC standard has become, progressively, an aspect of the international 
discussion concerning resource development in Indigenous traditional territories. The discussion 
of FPIC for the purposes of this thesis is limited to Article 32(2) of the UNDRIP, which requires 
states to ―…consult and cooperate in good faith with the Indigenous peoples concerned through 
their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to 
the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in 
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other 
resources.‖ 
Although the UNDRIP provides for consultation with Indigenous peoples to obtain their free 
prior and informed consent, there are diverse views as to the legal and practical implications of 
the principle of FPIC in the international legal community. This thesis proceeds on a widely-held 
view that posits that the FPIC requirements do not afford a general veto right to Indigenous 
peoples, but that they require consent as the objective of consultation pursued in good faith.
149
 
This view corresponds to a purposive approach to FPIC instead of employing a formalistic 
interpretation exercise.
150
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3.5 The Canadian Perspective on the UNDRIP 
After eleven years of deliberations and several revisions to the UNDRIP, it was finally approved 
by the United Nations General Assembly.
151
 In 2007, UNDRIP was adopted by an overwhelming 
majority vote.
152
 The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand voted against the 
UNDRIP.
153
 Canada expressed concerns with the provisions in the UNDRIP that it considered 
inconsistent with the existing Aboriginal rights guaranteed by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982.
154
 Canada explained that the FPIC principle and other provisions in the UNDRIP ―might 
call into question the finality of Canada‘s existing Aboriginal treaties and land claims 
agreements.‖155 There has since been a reversal of the opposing stance taken by Canada and the 
three other countries.
156
 
In 2010, Canada officially endorsed the UNDRIP as an indication of its commitment to 
strengthen its partnership with Aboriginal peoples to build Canada.
157
 At that time, Canada 
emphatically described the UNDRIP as aspirational and not legally binding.
158
 This assertion has 
since been contested as being Janus-faced because ―states never perceived the provisions of 
the Declaration as mere aspirations or they would not have been so active in its elaboration.‖159  
All the same, at the 15
th
 Session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
held in New York City in May 2016, the federal minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs, 
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Carolyn Bennett, declared Canada‘s full support of UNDRIP.160 Canada‘s complete support for 
UNDRIP signifies an important advancement toward reconciliation, but many challenges lie 
ahead of implementing the commitment. It bears noting that a private member‘s bill (C-262), 
which could have led to a statutory implementation of the UNDRIP in Canada, got to third 
reading in the Senate in June 2019.
161
 But it was not passed into law before the legislative 
session ended.
162
 
While the principle of FPIC in UNDRIP is not a legal requirement in Canada, the Supreme Court 
has developed a jurisprudence on the duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples when 
their rights might be adversely impacted by Crown decisions. Some writers on the FPIC concept 
posit that UNDRIP should function as a guide for Canadian courts in interpreting provisions in 
domestic legislation that are in themselves ambiguous.
163
 In Sackaney v. The Queen,
164
 the court 
held that although UNDRIP has been endorsed by Canada, being not ratified by Parliament, it is 
consequently not legally binding. While UNDRIP may influence contextual approaches to 
statutory interpretation, the courts will tend to hold that it does not give any substantive rights in 
Canada.
165
  In Simon, the court states that while the Court may consider interpretations that 
represent UNDRIP’s values, the courts will not accept arguments relying on UNDRIP as creating 
substantive rights or altering the duty to consult and accommodate.
166
  The Yukon Supreme 
Court in Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), among others, leaves 
room for more possibilities for interpretation informed by UNDRIP’s values.167 The court held 
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that while UNDRIP does not have any force of law in Canada, it is useful for a favourable 
interpretation of Canada‘s Constitution. 
Essentially, the UNDRIP (or even non-ratified treaties) cannot form part of Canadian law unless 
and until legislated upon.
168
 However, in what seems like a glimmer of hope that Canadian 
courts may shift from this position, Dwight Newman put forward the view that to the extent that 
UNDRIP is considered aspirational, it could progressively influence the courts.
169
  Chapters 4 
and 5 of this thesis will develop an approach to the duty to consult that follows the underlying 
legal principle of reconciliation and fits with the UNDRIP norms on FPIC. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The duty to consult and accommodate is a legal requirement to engage potentially affected 
Aboriginal communities when the Crown contemplates activities that will affect the 
communities. The duty to consult has undergone significant development.  In Sparrow, it was 
part of the justified infringement analysis only.  The Haida Nation trilogy of cases established 
the legal doctrine of duty to consult and where appropriate, accommodate Aboriginal peoples in 
every instance in advance of a Crown decision that might affect Aboriginal or treaty rights. In 
Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, the Supreme Court of Canada analyzed the 
meaningful discharge of the duty by an administrative body or regulatory agency, which could 
be applied to the context of nuclear regulation (and it would be possible to say more on the 
details of nuclear regulation and the duty to consult—an Appendix to this thesis sets out more 
details).  But all of these legal rules leave the possibility that the Crown can fulfill consultation 
duties in minimalist ways, thus setting up a framework of rules that depart from the underlying 
principle of reconciliation. 
Under international law, the duty to consult with Indigenous peoples is also a requirement, which 
is set out in ILO 169 and the UNDRIP, and this thesis has referred to the latter as a key 
international instrument that Canada has endorsed. The UNDRIP does not itself have binding 
force, but it can influence the courts in interpreting domestic laws. While the legal duty to 
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consult is intended to protect Aboriginal and treaty rights with the fundamental aim of achieving 
reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal society, the current structure of the 
constitutional duty does not live up to the promise of reconciliation.  The conception of FPIC in 
UNDRIP can offer inspiration in interpreting the constitutional duty to consult, while reaching 
alignment with the underlying Canadian principles.   
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Chapter 4: Towards Reconciliation: Assessing the Fundamental Objective of Section 35 
4.0 Introduction 
The role of reconciliation in Canada‘s politics concerning Crown-Aboriginal relationships is 
difficult to overemphasize. Canada has developed a judicially motivated jurisprudence of 
reconciliation in interpreting section 35.
170
 The Supreme Court of Canada has frequently 
acknowledged the use of the duty to consult as a legal instrument to meet the end of 
reconciliation.
171
 Indeed, in Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, the Court held that ―the 
reconciliation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in a mutually respectful long-term 
relationship is the grand purpose of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.‖172  Section 35, and 
the doctrines associated with it, should be interpreted in line with this purpose.
173
  
Writing in a scholarly context on the concept of reconciliation, Mark Walters has conceived 
reconciliation in three forms: reconciliation as resignation, reconciliation as consistency, and 
reconciliation as relationship. Walters suggests reconciliation as part of legality and describes it 
as a process of restoring the strained relationship between people.
174
 He argues that it requires a 
level playing field for the parties involved.  Reconciliation in this context refers to peoples 
reconciling to restore relationship.
175
 Walters argues that a meaningful reconciliation of 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies would consider ―jurisprudence of reconciliation as an 
inter-societal concept,‖ taking into account Aboriginal perspectives on reconciliation.176 
According to Walters, a relational form of reconciliation is relatively two-sided and has an 
inherent moral worth attached to it.
177
 It involves two parties reconciling to resolve their 
differences and re-establish an amicable relationship. A real sense of reconciliation includes 
genuine ―acts of mutual respect, tolerance, and goodwill that serve to heal rifts and create 
foundations for [a] harmonious relationship.‖178 Walters articulates ―a morally rich sense of 
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reconciliation,‖ as that which would help to re-establish a sense of self-respect and peace 
between Nations once at odds.
179
  
In contexts beyond the courts, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples endorsed the 
concept of reconciliation in 1996.
180
 In 2015, the concept resurfaced in the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission‘s (TRC) Final Report.181 According to the TRC, ―reconciliation is 
about establishing and maintaining a mutually respectful relationship between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal peoples in this country.‖ It is an ongoing process aimed at creating and 
upholding respectful inter-societal relationships through concrete engagements ―that demonstrate 
real societal change.‖ Furthermore, the TRC recommended revitalization of Aboriginal law and 
legal traditions, which in itself creates respectful relationships.
182
 
No doubt, Canada‘s reconciliation processes were born out of broader needs to consider and 
attempt to resolve Aboriginal historical grievances and the current socio-economic conditions 
facing Aboriginal communities and individuals. In many ways, Aboriginal communities are yet 
to see the positive impact of reconciliation in the area of duty to consult. Aboriginal communities 
have struggled for the recognition and protection of their constitutionally recognized rights. They 
have commenced legal actions against government and industry, or in some cases engaged in 
direct demonstrations against or disruption of projects, amongst various forms of civil 
disobedience.
183
 Reconciliation as a relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
societies in Canada is imperative to address these concerns and to ensure stability within Canada. 
The Supreme Court of Canada states in Haida Nation that a reconciliation process stems from 
Aboriginal rights guaranteed under s. 35(1) of the Constitution.  It is a process that flows from 
the Crown‘s duty of honourable dealing toward Aboriginal peoples.184 The duty to consult as 
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presently structured appears to establish an approach that ultimately requires minimal legal 
duties. This chapter argues that without embracing a genuine reconciliatory attitude that pays 
attention to the quality of Crown-Aboriginal relationships, the purpose of section 35 will not be 
achieved. This chapter uses the Supreme Court‘s account of reconciliation from Van der Peet to 
direct the discussion of reconciliation—the reconciliation of pre-existing Aboriginal societies 
with the assertion of Crown sovereignty.
185
 This chapter approaches the question of 
reconciliation in the light of the conception of reconciliationadvanced by McLachlin J. (as she 
then was) in her separate opinion in that case. Consistent with McLachlin J,‘s view, this thesis 
argues that to achieve reconciliation, the legal perspectives of both non-Aboriginal and 
Aboriginal societies should be incorporated and that full recognition must be given to the 
pre-existing Aboriginal tradition.
186
  This account of reconciliation should continue to influence 
the duty to consult. Therefore, future consultation processes should be treated as a site for 
ongoing reconciliation rather than a procedural box to be checked.  A procedural requirement 
that merely meets the judicially formulated rules could frustrate the purpose of section 35. Put 
differently, a minimalistic/formalistic approach to reaching the requirements of the duty to 
consult does not promote reconciliation and is thus ultimately inconsistent with Haida Nation 
itself. 
 
4.1 Reconciliation as the Main Objective of Section 35 
While enunciating the reason underlying the Aboriginal rights protected in section 35(1), it was 
held that when the Court identifies the purpose of a provision in the constitution or recognizes 
the interests which the provision is supposed to protect, the Court is clarifying the basis of the 
provision.  That is, it is stating the reasons behind the protection given by section 35. Therefore, 
the Court must ―explain the rationale and foundation of the recognition and affirmation of the 
special rights of [A]boriginal peoples; it must identify the basis for the special status that 
[A]boriginal peoples have within Canadian society as a whole.‖187 The Supreme Court linked the 
duty to consult and accommodate to the purpose of reconciliation. The Supreme Court states that 
                                                          
185
 Mikisew Cree, 2018, supra note     . 
186
 Van der Peet, supra note 4. 
187
 Van der Peet, ibid at para 27. 
39 
 
the duty to consult and accommodate imposes an obligation on the Crown to consult Aboriginal 
peoples when the Crown contemplates decisions that may have potential impacts on Aboriginal 
or treaty rights. The procedural duty is founded in section 35, and in all, should provide a basis 
for the articulated purpose of section 35. 
 
4.1.1 Doctrinal Shift in the Courts’ Understanding of the Reconciliation 
It is seemingly a common understanding of the Court that reconciliation is the overarching 
purpose of section 35, but the Court‘s interpretation of reconciliation has undergone numerous 
changes.
188
 The Court‘s initial consideration of the purpose of reconciliation occurred in the 
Sparrow decision, where the Court introduces an infringement test.
189
 The Court‘s understanding 
of reconciliation in Sparrow is that the federal government is required to justify the Crown‘s 
infringement on constitutionally protected Aboriginal rights.
190
 The Court held that ―federal 
power must be reconciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to 
demand the justification of any government regulation that infringes upon or denies [A]boriginal 
rights.‖191  
In Van der Peet, the court interpreted reconciliation as the purpose of section 35. The court held 
that section 35(1) offers the constitutional basis for reconciliation of the ―pre-existing 
[A]boriginal claims to the territory that now constitutes Canada, with the assertion of British 
sovereignty over that territory, to which the recognition and affirmation of [A]boriginal rights in 
s.35 (1) is directed.‖192  
In R v Gladstone,
193
 the Court adopted the interpretation in Van der Peet but held that some 
limitations on Aboriginal rights would be justifiable based on reconciliation in order to balance 
Aboriginal claims with the interests of the the rest of Canadian society. Michael McCrossan 
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notes that the Court altered its interpretation of reconciliation, justifying additional limitations on 
Aboriginal rights based on grounds of public interest.
194
 It is notable that the dissenting opinion 
of McLachlin J. (as she then was) on the conceptualization of reconciliation shows a significant 
deviation from Chief Justice Lamer‘s understanding and application of reconciliation. Justice 
McLachlin states that the preferable way to achieve reconciliation is through negotiation and 
negotiated agreement- it cannot be achieved through unilateral diminishment of Aboriginal 
peoples‘ rights.195 This view seems more consistent with the spirit of section 35 regarding 
Crown-Aboriginal relationships. 
Since Sparrow, Van der Peet, and Gladstone, the Supreme Court‘s articulations of reconciliation 
have continued to take different forms.
196
 Due to space limitations, this research will briefly 
mention the Supreme Court‘s decisions relating to the conception of reconciliation at this point. 
In Delgamuukw and R v. Marshall, the Court upheld the understanding of reconciliation in 
Gladstone, that is, a concept of reconciliation that could create limitations on Aboriginal 
peoples‘ rights, and expanded it to Aboriginal title.197 In Haida Nation, Taku River, and Mikisew 
Cree, the Court returned to the concept of reconciliation as the overarching objective of section 
35 and highlighted the significant role it plays in reconciling Aboriginal societies and non-
Aboriginal society.
198
 In Haida Nation, the Court held that reconciliation is a process ―flowing 
from the rights guaranteed by section 35 of the Constitution Act.‖199 
In the recent cases of Chippewas of the Thames and the companion case of Clyde River, the 
Court affirmed the role of the duty to consult in furthering reconciliation between the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples, the purpose of section 35.
200
  In the more recent case of Mikisew Cree, 2018 
the Court puts it succinctly: 
[T]he ultimate purpose of the honour of the Crown is the reconciliation of pre-existing 
Indigenous societies with the assertion of Crown sovereignty… Reconciliation is the 
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―fundamental objective of the modern law of aboriginal and treaty rights‖… The purpose 
of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, is to facilitate this reconciliation. 
The Court held further that the duty to consult, a ―valuable adjunct‖ of the honour of the Crown, 
plays an essential role in the ongoing process of reconciliation. To facilitate reconciliation 
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, the duty to consult requires the Crown to act 
honourably in ways that protect section 35 rights. According to the Supreme Court of Canada, 
the ―endeavour of reconciliation is [the] first principle of Aboriginal law.‖201 
In Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations,
202
 the 
majority of the Court held that, while the hope of consultation is reconciling Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal interests, this may not be possible in some cases.
203
 The decision, according to 
Hamilton and Nichols, not only reverses judicial precedents set in the duty to consult case law, 
but it also creates a ―foundational failure of Section 35.‖204 In this way, the Court appears to 
generate a misunderstanding of its previously stated position regarding reconciliation as the 
fundamental objective of section 35. The position stated consistently in earlier case law was that 
the purpose of section 35 is the reconciliation of the Crown‘s asserted sovereignty and 
Aboriginal interests.
205
 It was also stated again in Mikisew Cree, 2018.  The statements in 
Ktunaxa are an outlier and should not be considered to take away from the general arc of the case 
law. 
The process of reconciliation presents much potential if the Crown is committed to meaningfully 
negotiating and addressing historical grievances. The duty to consult is an essential aspect of 
Canadian law that seeks to reconcile Crown sovereignty with pre-existing Aboriginal claims. 
However, the jurisprudence seems to be implemented in a manner that is sometimes inconsistent 
with reconciliation. The Canadian government will only be fulfilling its promise of reconciliation 
under section 35 if the Crown approaches consultation with the intent to reach an agreement.  
This position flows from a larger set of arguments. 
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By way of background reminder, in Sparrow, the Court‘s decision seems to confront unilateral 
historical actions taken by the Crown, stating that those actions would no longer be covered by 
judicial immunity.
206
  However, the Court has restated that section 35 does not guarantee a 
specific outcome; thus, Aboriginal claimants cannot advance ―absolute claims.‖207  As developed 
in the rules stated in later case law, the duty to consult gives no right to a veto and requires no 
Aboriginal consent before carrying out a project.
208
 In effect, the duty to consult does not 
preclude the Crown from proceeding with a project where Aboriginal peoples withhold their 
consent.
209
 The Supreme Court conceptualizes reconciliation such that it does not obligate the 
Crown to obtain Aboriginal consent. The Court‘s conception merely creates a regime that places 
limitations on the Crown‘s administrative authority.210 
In this, the law seems to give the Crown the ability to approach consultation processes in a 
manner aimed only at the minimal requirements. In Mikisew Cree, 2018, a case which came after 
Ktunaxa Nation, the Court specified that ―the principle of reconciliation and not rigid formalism 
should drive the development of Aboriginal law.‖211 Ktunaxa Nation was a bit of a 
misunderstanding of the previous decisions regarding the concept reconciliation. This 
misunderstanding appears to have been corrected in Mikisew Cree, 2018, which came after 
Ktunaxa Nation.  No matter the outcome of a consultation process, the Crown‘s approach to 
consultation has a significant role to play in building a mutual Crown-Aboriginal relation that is 
beneficial to them. Moreover, the need for reconciliation gives rise to the Crown having to 
conduct itself with honour in dealing with Aboriginal peoples. More so, courts have held that a 
purposive interpretation of the honour of the Crown is vital to promote the ongoing process of 
reconciliation.
212
  
Thus, reconciliation is an on-going process that breathes life to an anticipation of a favourable 
outcome. Reconciliation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies is that which places the 
legal values of both societies at equal weight. It frames a model of consultation that positions the 
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Crown and Aboriginal societies in a nation-to-nation relationship while revitalizing Aboriginal 
protection under the constitution. It consists of mutually established flexible processes through 
which decisions and authorities are reconciled to support the relationship between Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal societies and to effectively resolve disputes that may arise.  
 
4.1.2 Honourable Dealing  
The Supreme Court has recognized that the duty to consult stems from the purpose of 
reconciliation. In line with this, the Supreme Court of Canada gave a purposive interpretation of 
section 35. In Haida Nation, the Court stated that the ―duty to consult and accommodate by its 
very nature entails balancing of Aboriginal and other interests and thus lies closer to the aim of 
reconciliation at the heart of Crown-Aboriginal relations.‖213 In its decision in Van der Peet, the 
Court referred to the scholarship of Walters, which indicates that true reconciliation will consider 
the Aboriginal perspective as well as the common law perspective, placing equal weight on 
both.
214
 Indeed, Walters stated, ―a morally and politically defensible conception of [A]boriginal 
rights will incorporate Canadian Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal legal perspectives.‖215 The 
Supreme Court of Canada seemingly worked with Walters‘s claim on reconciling Aboriginal 
legal traditions and common law.  
However, it has also been contended that Walters‘s assertion appears to have been weakened by 
the Court‘s use of the expressions ―Aboriginal perspective‖ and ―common law‖ in developing 
Aboriginal rights in a manner that elevates the common law concepts while excluding Aboriginal 
legal principles.
216
  On a cynical view, the Court has thus effectively held that it is not 
appropriate to apportion equal weight to both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal perspectives. The 
Aboriginal perspective must be structured in terms recognizable under the Canadian legal 
framework.
217
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The manner in which the Supreme Court articulated reconciliation seems to create a significant 
degree of privileging of the common law over Aboriginal laws. The court conceptualizes an 
approach to reconciliation that limits Aboriginal perspectives, requiring that Aboriginal rights 
under section 35 be structured such that they are in conformity with the Canadian legal 
framework. This, therefore, indicates that Aboriginal claims have to be structured in a way that is 
recognized by the Canadian courts. This approach does not consider whether a structuring of 
Aboriginal values or relationships to their traditional land in a way that is consistent with the 
Canadian legal framework exerts pressure on the Aboriginal legal structure. The Court failed to 
give authority to the Aboriginal legal regime, limiting the possibility of achieving reconciliation, 
the purpose of section 35.  
Regardless of the attempt to recognize Aboriginal values and laws, section 35 largely stems from 
common law and non-Aboriginal vision of land rights. Where the common law serves as the 
ultimate process for measuring Aboriginal legal values, it essentially guarantees that non-
Aboriginal values predominate even within section 35.
218
 This conception gives a prerogative to 
non-Aboriginal legal perspective and also elevates non-Aboriginal interpretation of Aboriginal 
and treaty rights. Section 35 should function as a tool to end Aboriginal struggle to protect their 
Aboriginal and treaty rights. It is expected that section 35 will resolve the historical rules that 
privilege non-Aboriginal vision for the interpretation of the Aboriginal and treaty rights.  
However, it appears that Aboriginal peoples have continued in the struggle to protect their rights, 
and the ―new rules of the game increasingly look like the old rules. After some initial promises, 
the common law as applied within section 35 seems to be collapsing back into itself and 
interpreting Aboriginal and treaty rights through non-Aboriginal categories and principles.‖219 
The approach explained above seems to curtail the potential of achieving the aim of section 35 as 
it creates domination in the process of reconciliation between diverse cultures.
220
 Vermette 
argues that this approach pays more attention to the common law, requiring Aboriginal legal 
traditions to accommodate the common law, the assertion of sovereignty, and the needs of the 
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broader society.
221
 Vermette‘s position lends credence to the argument that the failure to give 
equal legal weight to both legal perspectives will always require that Aboriginal peoples do all 
the reconciling.
222
 The approach that requires Aboriginal peoples to do all the reconciliation falls 
within a different conception of reconciliation – ―reconciliation as resignation.‖223 Walters 
describes that approach as asymmetrical, requiring Aboriginal peoples to resign to the given 
circumstances that may not change, leaving Aboriginal peoples in the lurch. On this conception, 
Aboriginal peoples, therefore, are to adjust their expectations according to the Crown‘s idea of 
how their traditional territories should be used.
224
 This, therefore, raises the question: where lies 
the honour of the Crown in the reconciliation process? The Crown makes the policies that tend 
towards reconciliation without taking into account Aboriginal legal principles. Additionally, the 
Crown analyzes and implements these policies through the personnel involved in the process of 
duty to consult acting on behalf of the Crown. 
It has been said earlier that the honour of the Crown has been established as a constitutional 
principle and an essential anchor in this area of reconciliation.
225
 The Crown is required to 
conceive an honourable approach to reconciliation. Historically, the foundation of the principle 
of the honour of the Crown suggests that it must be construed liberally to mirror the basic 
realities from which it arises. According to the Supreme Court of Canada, the principle of ―[t]he 
honour of the Crown gives rise to different duties in different circumstances.‖226 The Court held 
that if we must achieve reconciliation between the Crown and Aboriginal societies, the Crown 
must act honourably regarding all its transactions with Aboriginal peoples.
227
  
Furthermore, Haida Nation significantly supports the argument that reconciliation stems from 
rights guaranteed by section 35(1). The Court held that the ―process of reconciliation flows from 
the Crown‘s duty of honourable dealing toward Aboriginal peoples, which arises in turn from the 
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Crown‘s assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and de facto control of land and 
resources that were formerly in the control of that people.‖ 228 
Also, the Court has analyzed reconciliation such that it makes the Crown obligated to consult 
honourably with the Aboriginal groups who, in the context of treaties right, have paid ―dearly for 
their entitlement…‖229 Surrendering of the Aboriginal interest certainly is a ―hefty purchase 
price‖ and requires not less than honourable conduct; otherwise, mitigation measures adopted 
through an inadequate process would limit rather than foster the process of reconciliation.
230
 
Therefore, the honour of the Crown should become the catchphrase of government officials 
consulting on behalf of Crown to implement the duty to consult towards reconciliation.   
True reconciliation requires the actual implementation of the duty to consult towards achieving 
reconciliation. Also, Canada must be thinking seriously towards achieving this goal because 
failure to do so will only be a reminder of past grievances.
231
 Aboriginal peoples should not even 
fight so much to sustain their rights, taking action against the Crown or engaging in civil 
disobedience.  In Delgamuukw, the court linked reconciliation to the Crown‘s duty of good faith 
in negotiating with Aboriginal groups. The court held that the ―best approach … is a process of 
negotiation and reconciliation that properly considers the complex and competing interests at 
stake.‖232 Correspondingly, the Crown acting honourably should be able to genuinely negotiate 
with Aboriginal groups to fulfill the purpose of reconciliation.   
 
4.2 The Limits of the Duty to Consult as a Procedural Requirement for Meeting the 
Reconciliation Objective 
The goals and the underlying objectives associated with the duty to consult appear inspiring. It 
has been explained earlier that the duty to consult and accommodate is developed as a significant 
legal instrument to foster reconciliation in the area of Crown-Aboriginal relations with respect to 
Aboriginal and treaty rights.  
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However, the Court‘s articulation of the legal rules on this duty may not present opportunities for 
Aboriginal peoples to make decisions about how they wish to use their traditional territories. 
More so, the Supreme Court enunciated accommodation as requiring ―compromise‖ to balance 
conflicting interests and ―good faith efforts to understand each other‘s concerns and move to 
address them.‖233 The Supreme Court highlighted the need to balance competing interests with 
Aboriginal and treaty rights for the purpose of reconciliation, reducing the potential for 
accommodation. In practice, accommodation measures seem to result in minor modifications to 
government actions, creating a substantial burden on Aboriginal peoples.
234
       
This section points towards practical challenges around the practical implementation of the duty 
to consult, which seem to make it difficult to achieve meaningful engagement and advance the 
constitutional goal of reconciliation. These issues bear the risk of minimizing the potential for 
meaningful consultation, and they threaten the possibility of reconciliation and building long 
term Crown-Aboriginal relation, again illustrating that the legal rules enunciated on the duty to 
consult and functioning in practice have failed to line up with its purposes.  
 
4.2.1 Failure to Manage Cumulative Effects  
The cumulative impact of projects on Aboriginal communities is one of the complex issues to 
deal with in the consultation process. In spite of the complexities, the court has held that the 
Crown is expected to always honourably ―work with Aboriginal peoples in a spirit of 
reconciliation to consider the cumulative effects of projects in the consultation process.‖235 SMR 
project activities may involve several minimal and independent actions considered to be 
individually insignificant.
236
 But, over time and space, these small activities could result in 
significant and permanent adverse impacts in the environment. Since gradual changes are 
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minimal, the effects often remain insignificant and ignored until the cumulative effects are found 
to be of a more significant magnitude.
237
 
The duty to consult is not activated by historical impacts; it is not the vehicle to address past 
grievances.
238
 The duty to consult is also limited to the negative impacts from the particular 
decision by the Crown. But, it may be difficult to understand the magnitude of the impact of a 
project on the ability of Aboriginal peoples to carry on their constitutionally guaranteed rights 
without considering the larger context.
239
 Thus, cumulative impacts of an ongoing project and 
past context may be relevant in assessing the scope of the duty to consult.
240
  
Some Aboriginal peoples are concerned that their rights are being compromised gradually by 
numerous decisions on project development, which have strained their ability to exercise their 
rights.
241
 This practically constitutes a threat to consultation processes on resource development. 
While proponents are focused on the additional incremental impacts of their projects, 
―Aboriginal groups are often thinking about how past, present and future development have or 
will impact their communities and the ability to exercise their asserted or established rights.‖242 
Of meaningful concern here is that assessment of cumulative effects involves a lot of challenging 
considerations, requiring meaningful time.
243
 Proponents prefer that projects are approved, 
paying minimal costs concerning environmental protection, but Aboriginal peoples demand that 
concerted attention be paid to the long-term effect of project activities on their constitutional 
rights.
244
 Things will be problematic if project proponents do only what they must to get projects 
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approved, that is to say, ―minimising effort concerning cumulative effects.‖245  Aboriginal 
groups fear that the cumulative effect of various Crown authorizations of resource developments 
and other activities result in the deprivation of their constitutionally recognized rights.
246
 If the 
issue of cumulative effects is overlooked without concerted efforts to address the effects, the 
time might come when there will be no Aboriginal or treaty rights left to be exercised. 
Aboriginal traditional harvesting rights would obviously ―be in question, and a potential action 
for treaty infringement, including the demand for a Sparrow justification, would be a legitimate 
First Nation response.‖247    
 
4.2.2 Delegation to Third Party 
Generally, it is believed that the delegation of some aspects of the duty to consult has become 
inevitable to enhance the quality of consultation and an efficiently conducted process. While 
delegation practices bring about some benefits, they also introduce tensions surrounding the 
Crown‘s delegation of the duty to consult to tribunals which can implement only the consultation 
powers expressly conferred on them,
248
 and the proponents who may carry out the procedural 
aspect of consultation.
249
 While holding that the duty to consult rests on the Crown, the Court 
relating procedural aspects of consultation to environmental assessment processes indicated that 
the Crown ―may delegate procedural aspects of consultation to industry proponents seeking a 
particular development.‖250  
The procedural components of the duty to consult, under the law, may be delegated to industry 
proponents seeking a particular development.
251
 Some provincial Crown policies confer this 
responsibility on the government; others generally designate the ―substantive execution‖ of the 
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duty to consult informally to the proponents.
252
 What is essential to the delegation process, 
however, is to distinguish the substantive component
253
 of consultation from the procedural 
component, hence, clarifying which aspect of the duty that is delegable.
 254
 In an attempt to 
sensitise the Crown about the limit to how far implied delegation may be assumed, the Court 
expressed concern about giving out undefined discretion to proponents stating that ―[i]t is open 
to governments to set up regulatory schemes to address the procedural requirements appropriate 
to different problems at different stages, thereby strengthening the reconciliation process and 
reducing recourse to the courts… Such a policy, while falling short of a regulatory scheme, may 
guard against unstructured discretion and provide a guide for decision-makers.‖255 
Delegation of consultation presents some ―elements‖ of complexity in the duty to consult.256 Of 
particular concern to Aboriginal peoples is that delegation undermines the Nation-to-Nation 
relationship: ―it creates a disconnect between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown.‖257 The 
underlying objective of the duty to consult is to promote reconciliation between the Crown and 
the First Nations through a renewed relationship that is more demonstrative of the nation-to-
nation relationship, ―rooted in the two-row wampum tradition of autonomy, mutual respect, and 
friendship.‖258  
The province of Alberta, for instance, has a policy that appears to define the provincial Crown as 
merely playing the role of a ―neutral arbiter‖ between proponents and First Nations, detaching 
itself from substantially participating in consultation and accommodation.
259
 Additionally, Ariss 
et al argue that excessive delegation sets the Crown up to act as a ―neutral arbiter‖… seeking 
balance instead of protecting Aboriginal rights,‖ an approach which seems to reduce the Crown‘s 
responsibility and holds out Aboriginal peoples merely as ―stakeholders‖ instead of nations.260 
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This mars the opportunities that present themselves for Crown and Aboriginal peoples to engage 
in meaningful consultation and to advance potential for reconciliation.
261
  
Delegation to entities that are neither the federal nor the provincial Crown with limited capacity 
to act under the enabling statute may limit the extent to which they can, for instance, exercise 
their ability to make accommodations. Being creatures of statute, entities such as adjudicatory 
tribunals, municipalities, and regulatory boards may determine that they are able to discharge 
consultation only to the extent that is delegated in the creating statute.
262
 In Huu-Ay-Aht, the 
Court found that the Crown‘s effort to consult was not sufficient.263 The accommodation 
measure offered was not sufficient as those negotiating on behalf of the Crown determined that 
they were bound by the provincial policy, having no authority to offer accommodation beyond 
what was available under the enabling statute.
264
  
The above argument may also apply to consultation delegation involving project proponents who 
may offer some form of accommodation including job offers and training opportunities for the 
First Nations, but as project proponents, they are ―quite limited by their nature and capacity.‖265 
Passelac-Ross and Potes argued that ―over-reliance‖ on the proponent to provide accommodation 
will result in significantly limited accommodation measures that may not adequately address 
Aboriginal concerns, though it makes practical sense to involve proponents in some consultative 
duties.
266
 Most often the accommodation measures necessary to address the legitimate concerns 
of Aboriginal peoples might exceed capacities of the proponent.
267
           
A delegation to the proponent also carries another drawback with it. Once the decision-making 
process is delegated to the proponent, ―the discourse naturally shifts gears,‖ and how to get the 
proposed project done becomes the central question for consideration.
268
 This has the tendency to 
make Aboriginal groups appear ―obstructionist‖ in the event that they object to the approval of 
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the project ―and having to resort to injunctions, and in some cases, blockades.‖269 This is more so 
where proponents have invested so much effort and money with the high expectation that 
consultation produces a positive outcome. The proponent naturally focuses more on getting a 
project done within a timeline. This approach results in Aboriginal concerns not being 
sufficiently addressed such that meaningful consultation and accommodation cannot occur.  
Furthermore, less emphasis should be placed on ―proponent certainty and project completion‖ as 
this approach shifts focus from the principal aim of consultation, reducing the scope and 
potential result of consultation process, while the proponent‘s target remains focused on the 
completion of its project.
270
 This affects the ability of Aboriginal communities who are inundated 
with many consultation requests and voluminous documents sent by proponents for review to 
present their processes and legal norms to the consultation process.
271
  
Delegation to industry will cause confusion if the Crown stands only as an umpire rather than 
being proactively involved. Besides, the Court also states that the Crown is saddled with the sole 
legal responsibility for consultation. It is the Crown only that can effectively address the 
different understandings of the meaning of Crown land and traditional territory. The Crown only 
can effectively determine what rights Aboriginal peoples have regarding these lands. Meaningful 
consultation, therefore, requires the Crown to be proactively involved in the entire consultation 
process.
272
  
 
4.2.3 Balancing of Interests: Public Interest  
On one hand, the government seems to place too much emphasis on the public interest in the 
balancing of interest principle. This appears to create a natural tendency that the government 
would tend not to stop a proposed activity even where there is Aboriginal opposition. In Van der 
Peet, McLachlin J. in her dissenting judgment explained the limitations that could be present in 
relying on the concept of reconciliation to balance the rights of Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals: 
it permits the Crown to transfer the Aboriginal rights under section 35 to non-Indigenous 
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peoples‘ culture, where Aboriginal rights must find their exercise. Secondly, it limits 
constitutionally protected Aboriginal peoples‘ rights and elevates non-Aboriginal peoples‘ 
interests not protected under the constitution.
273
 The concept of reconciliation which stems from 
the goal of protecting Aboriginal rights enshrined under section 35 of the constitution should be 
conceived as a tool to achieve ―a just and lasting settlement of [A]boriginal claims.‖274 
The public interest context in the balancing of interests for the purpose of reconciliation appears 
to serve more as a shield to continue with a project even where there is a major protest by 
Aboriginal communities. The court has held that project approval that breaches the 
constitutionally protected rights of Aboriginal peoples does not serve the public interest.
275
 The 
major drawback of the ―balance-approach‖ is that it undermines the respect for Aboriginal 
constitutionally recognized rights from which the Crown‘s duty to consult was generated in the 
first place.
276
 As a starting point, political consultations required to foster reconciliation must 
basically take cognisance of the Aboriginal peoples‘ constitutional entitlements.277 Ariss et al 
argued that:  
Aboriginal and treaty rights are a constitutive element of Canada, and economic or other 
interests do not amount to rights. To make Aboriginal and treaty rights commensurable 
with ―interests‖ misunderstands their purpose and standing. Any balancing in 
accommodations must stem from section 35 and not reduce Aboriginal and treaty rights 
to interests.
278
  
Policies that place much emphasis on ―public interest‖ in the ―balancing of interest‖ approach 
appear to reduce the significance of consultation and accommodation, which seek to safeguard 
Aboriginal and treaty rights.
279
 This approach puts forward a standpoint that is not as much 
concerned about safeguarding Aboriginal rights, as it places much interest on guaranteeing 
―greater certainty for government, industry and First Nations.‖280  
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Rachel Ariss et al argue that the Nova Scotia
281
 and British Columbia
282
 policies described 
accommodation in a manner that could lead to an exchange of Aboriginal peoples‘ rights too 
easily with interests of the broader societies.
283
 They also argue that Ontario‘s policy description 
of accommodation as ―a process of balancing of interests‖ portrays the provincial government as 
an impartial umpire among groups with interests rather than functioning as a Crown agent for 
discharging the legal duty.
284
 Interestingly, however, Saskatchewan‘s policy introduces the 
terminology of rights rather than balancing of interests, evidently recognizing and respecting the 
fact that Aboriginal peoples are ―holders of Treaty and/or Aboriginal rights‖ and that it will not 
treat First Nations and Métis as mere ―stakeholders‖.285 Saskatchewan‘s policy has as its 
foremost objective ―[to] respect and protect Treaty and Aboriginal rights by ensuring, through 
the consultation process and subsequent decisions, that negative impacts on these rights and uses 
are avoided, minimized or mitigated and rights are accommodated, as appropriate.‖286  
Balancing the interests of Canadian society with Aboriginal resistance to infringement of their 
Aboriginal rights creates unrest and dissatisfaction where Aboriginal communities feel their 
interests are minimally addressed. The Court held that the government must balance the interests 
of the potentially affected Aboriginal community with that of the non-Aboriginal society in 
implementing the duty to consult.
287
 Governments for their part seem to lean largely on 
‗balancing interests‘, consulting only to meet the minimal requirement, which may not 
necessarily protect Aboriginal rights. This seems to beg the question: what is the implication of 
section 35 if the rights it ought to protect eventually erode with no Aboriginal or treaty rights left 
to exercise in the bid of balancing public interests with Aboriginal rights?
288
 
                                                          
281
 Nova Scotia, Government of Nova Scotia Policy and Guidelines: Consultation with the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia 
(April 2015) at 24. Nova Scotia‘s policy provides that, ―in discussing accommodation measures, the government 
may have to balance Mi‘kmaq interests with broader societal interests.‖ 
282
 British Columbia, Updated Procedures for Meeting Legal Obligations when Consulting with First Nations, 
Interim (May 2010) at 6. British Columbia‘s policy states that, ―the Crown must balance concerns regarding 
potential impact of the decision on the Aboriginal interest with other societal interests.‖ 
283
 Ariss et al, supra note 36 at 49. 
284
 Ibid; Ontario, Ministry of Indigenous Relations and Reconciliation, Draft Guidelines for Ministries on 
Consultation with Aboriginal Peoples Related to Aboriginal and Treaty Rights (17 November 
2015) [Ontario MIRR Draft Guidelines]. 
285
 Government of Saskatchewan, First Nation and Métis Consultation Policy Framework (June 2010) at 3. 
[Saskatchewan Consultation Policy].   
286
 Ibid at 3. 
287
 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 50. 
288
 Mikisew Cree, supra note 2 at para 48. 
55 
 
Emphasis on the balancing of interests appears to overlook the main aim of protecting Aboriginal 
rights. Aboriginal peoples are not stakeholders but ―holders of Treaty and/or Aboriginal 
rights.‖289 The language prioritising balancing of interests suggests the reluctance of some 
provinces to work in actual partnership with Aboriginal communities. The perception of 
Aboriginal peoples as having the reciprocal duty to ensure advancement of proposed projects and 
a consequent duty to facilitate them ―detracts from an understanding of consultation as a means 
of rights protection and advancement.‖290    
Another problem with the balancing approach is that it does not account for the possibility that 
there are interests that cannot be balanced. While balancing interests is necessary to ensure that 
Aboriginal peoples do not unnecessarily obstruct developments, it should be kept in mind that in 
some circumstances, a ‗balancing of interests‘ will not be enough because ―there are interests 
that cannot be balanced, risks that cannot be mitigated and lines that cannot be crossed—there 
are promises that cannot be broken.‖291 This circumstance includes where the Aboriginal 
peoples‘ identity is at risk. Balancing of interests that give the Crown the prerogative to insist on 
proceeding with a project where it deems necessary, notwithstanding Aboriginal objections, 
could only be appropriate if the Crown recognizes that not all interests can be balanced.   
Balancing the interests of Canadian society with projects that potentially threaten the ability of 
Aboriginal peoples to continue with the exercise of their constitutionally recognized rights is a 
breach of the Crown‘s general fiduciary duty to Aboriginal people and the fundamental 
obligation under section 35 to protect Aboriginal and Treaty rights.
292
 Notably, the Ontario 
MIRR Draft Guidelines states that obtaining Aboriginal consent may be necessary in rare 
circumstances such as where there are serious impacts. Unfortunately, this provision 
accommodates only Aboriginal title.293   
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As noted earlier, the Saskatchewan Policy requires dialogue with First Nation communities on 
proposed accommodation measures, which may entail considering many options, including 
stopping a proponent‘s proposed project.294  Provinces like BC and Ontario make similar 
provisions—their policies do not specifically make provisions that include rejecting the 
application to conduct an activity. Be that as it may, this proclivity tilts towards building 
relationships with First Nations. 
295
      
On the other hand, some Aboriginal groups in Canada (also at the international level) believe that 
the duty to consult provides a veto over development plans, and to some, at least, there is a high 
expectation that the principle will metamorphose into an absolute right to give or withhold their 
consent. While the character of the consultation process is determined by the nature of 
Aboriginal rights and the interest at stake and the potential impacts of the proposed development, 
the duty does not contemplate a veto power and should not be construed as such.  
The Court in several decisions has repeatedly clarified that the duty does not confer a veto 
power.
296
 Though the duty to consult aims to curb the Crown‘s unilateral infringement of 
Aboriginal rights, it does not provide Aboriginal peoples with the absolute right to reject 
proposed development.
297
 An absolute veto right with no balancing mechanism in respect of 
matters that are of legitimate interest to the society is inconsistent with the standard of 
participatory consultation that was expounded by the Supreme Court and incorporated in 
international norms.    
The duty to consult is said to strike a balance between Aboriginal peoples and the rest of 
Canadian society, while intending to offer an appropriate degree of protection to Aboriginal 
rights and enabling the government to go ahead with making decisions in the ―context of 
uncertainties on the final shape of Aboriginal rights.‖298 Hence there is a ―reciprocal‖ duty on 
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Aboriginal groups not to frustrate, but to engage in decision-making processes in good faith 
while expressing their concerns.
299
   
Furthermore, within the jurisdiction of the Crown‘s sovereign rights and duties towards society 
as a whole, the Crown reserves the final prerogative to decide whether a project may continue 
after consultation with Aboriginal peoples and there is no obligation to reach an agreement with 
Aboriginal groups such that there is no veto power. The Crown is however required to consult 
diligently to ensure that Aboriginal rights and interests are protected respecting the impact of its 
decisions.  
So if there is no obligation to reach an agreement and no power to veto, this creates an incentive 
for the Crown or proponents to actually conduct decision-making process that may be fulfilled 
merely at a minimal level, knowing that the doctrine of the duty to consult provides the Crown 
with the ultimate right to decide if a proposed project could proceed. This reflects an apparent 
power imbalance present in the legal doctrine. It goes further to show that Aboriginal peoples‘ 
ability to protect their constitutional rights may often be restricted by the term ―compromise‖ 
even before consultation processes take place.
300
 The implications of this approach towards duty 
to consult are unlikely to contribute to the goal of inter-societal reconciliation. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
The Supreme Court has advanced the duty to consult and accommodate in order to promote a 
long-lasting mutual relation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies in Canada. While 
the duty is intended to protect Aboriginal and treaty rights and ultimately achieve reconciliation 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies, the current structure of the duty to consult 
seems to make it difficult to effectively implement the duty to consult for the protection of 
Aboriginal rights and to further the goal of reconciliation. The Canadian courts have 
emphatically stated that the process of accommodation requires balancing of interests, creating a 
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view of the duty to consult that requires Aboriginal peoples to do all the balancing. This also 
creates leeway for a minimal approach to implementation of the duty to consult.  
In essence, the Crown‘s approach to consultation should support a progressive relationship 
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the guiding 
principle in all circumstances is for the Crown to uphold the honour of the Crown and to 
implement reconciliation in a manner that considers Aboriginal interests at stake.
301
 A Crown 
action that does not consider the constitutional commitments under section 35 is the ―antithesis 
of reconciliation and mutual respect.‖302 An impoverished approach to the fulfilment of the duty 
to consult and accommodate will no doubt leave the principal goal of section 35 unattained.  This 
approach should be avoided in order to create a feeling of trust and to enhance better 
relationships of mutual respect and equal opportunity. The next chapter suggests that embracing 
a consent standard would support meaningful negotiation and dialogue to resolve possible 
disagreements in future projects, thus better complying with the underlying legal principle of the 
duty to consult. 
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Chapter 5: The Pathway to Effective Consultation and Reconciliation 
5.0 Introduction   
The current structure of the duty to consult and accommodate does not meet the goal of 
reconciliation, the fundamental objective of section 35. This chapter discusses at some length 
why the international norm of FPIC might have bearing on Canadian duty to consult case law.  It 
discusses how there can be a concept of consultation aiming at consent that differs from the 
current duty to consult and that also differs from an obligation to obtain consent/veto 
power.  This chapter explores ways in which the law could accommodate a concept of 
consultation aiming at consent and how such a standard has been applied in particular 
scenarios.  Moving toward such an approach would comply better with the principle of 
reconciliation.  
The Supreme Court of Canada developed the duty to consult and accommodate as a fundamental 
constitutional instrument to support the Crown-Aboriginal relationship concerning Aboriginal 
and treaty rights. The constitutional duty burdens the Crown with the obligation to consult and 
where appropriate accommodate Aboriginal peoples‘ rights when the Crown contemplates any 
development that may have potential impacts on Aboriginal or treaty rights.  
The honour of the Crown is best reflected by a requirement of consultation with a view to true 
reconciliation.
303
 In this, the Court seems to take the position that it is not to interfere in the 
ongoing reconciliation process – parties are expected to work out what is best for them. The duty 
recognizes that parties must work together to reconcile their interests.
304
  The court encourages 
reconciliation driven by negotiation between the parties as it appears to be the best way to reach 
reconciliation between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown.
305
 The Court can, however, order the 
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government to embrace the attitude of honour that is essential for the reconciliation of peoples to 
flourish.
306
 
The courts‘ distribution of negotiating power in framing the duty to consult does not pay enough 
attention to Aboriginal values to motivate meaningful negotiation in the duty to consult. This 
appears to be done in an attempt to maintain the Crown‘s assertion of sovereignty around the 
constitutional order in framing the duty to consult.
307
 As it is, the Crown is responsible for 
determining the strength of the Aboriginal claim. The Crown also assesses Aboriginal concerns 
and situates Aboriginal consultation within the spectrum analysis, a process that takes time, 
sometimes even longer than anticipated. A consultation process may also require that the Crown 
incur costs in providing resources for meaningful Aboriginal participation. Because of these 
aspects, there could be tendencies on the part of the Crown‘s representatives to assess Aboriginal 
concerns as minimal, an approach that will be unlikely to support social or political harmony 
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples.
308
  
Thus, consultation for future development should be treated as a site for ongoing reconciliation 
between the Crown and Aboriginal communities rather than a procedural box to be ticked. A 
minimalistic approach to reaching the requirements of the constitutional duty by government 
officials will not promote reconciliation. For instance, where government officials treat 
consultation processes as a mere courtesy or neglect to give notice of the decision to take up a 
portion of Aboriginal land until a long period has elapsed, it creates an unfortunate effect of 
undermining an opportunity for effective communication between parties in support of 
reconciliation.
309
   
Reconciliation necessarily includes positive actions of mutual respect that function ―to heal rifts 
and create foundations for a harmonious relationship.‖310 The Crown‘s decisions affecting 
Aboriginal and treaty rights can uphold Aboriginal rights and foster reconciliation goals, 
establishing mutual understanding and trust between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown. A 
diligent approach to engaging Aboriginal peoples in the decision-making process in future 
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development, therefore, is necessary. A decision-making process devoid of meaningful 
consultation will most likely limit the ongoing reconciliation process mandated by the Crown‘s 
solemn promise recognizing and affirming Aboriginal and treaty rights. The ultimate goal of 
section 35 may remain unfulfilled without directions on how the government can engage 
Aboriginal groups in meaningful consultation processes. 
 
5.1 Transformative Reconciliation 
Canada‘s duty to consult doctrine has a purpose of furthering reconciliation. As argued by 
Walters, reconciliation perceived as relationship (―a richer sense of reconciliation‖), is related to 
the ideal of legality, the way by which laws are recognized as just.
311
 The concept of 
reconciliation has been described by some writers as robust and progressive. However, the 
concept‘s interpretation in the implementation of policy is challenged by the understanding and 
the discharge of principle as a mere routine.
312
   
The TRC links a rich sense of reconciliation to self-determination for Aboriginal peoples in 
Canada, a position that resonates with an aspect of Cathal Doyle‘s perception of the FPIC 
requirement.
313
 In one of the calls by the TRC, it encourages Canada to incorporate Aboriginal 
right to self-determination into its constitutional and statutory framework and also into its civic 
institutions, in line with the principles and standards of UNDRIP.
314
 The Commission states that 
revitalizing Aboriginal self-determination consistently with the principle of UNDRIP is the 
appropriate standard for true reconciliation in present-day Canada.
315
 The reconciliation 
proposed by the TRC is based on rebuilding Crown-Aboriginal relationships envisioned ―in the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763 and in post-Confederation Treaties‖316 Making consent the objective 
of consultation could enable Canada to develop an all-inclusive idea of reconciliation that 
recognizes the relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians.
317
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5.1.1 Advancing Reconciliation through Meaningful Consultation   
The UNDRIP, which embodies the principle of FPIC, does not use the word reconciliation, but it 
expresses the need to promote good relationships between states and Indigenous peoples. The 
TRC recommended that Canada adopt FPIC as a framework for reconciliation. The concept of 
obtaining Indigenous peoples‘ FPIC before development on their traditional lands sets an 
important aspiration for Canada‘s duty to consult and accommodate. However, there have been 
some misconceptions about FPIC in the UNDRIP, including the scope of FPIC and when 
Indigenous consent is required.
318
 Barelli describes FPIC as a fundamental aspect of Indigenous 
self-determination. FPIC is minimally understood as requiring states to consult with Indigenous 
peoples in good faith to reach an agreement. FPIC is also understood as requiring that a 
development that is capable of affecting Indigenous rights should not be executed without the 
affected Indigenous peoples‘ consent.319   
Doyle conceived the FPIC requirement within a viewpoint of Indigenous self-determination.
320
 
Doyle states that FPIC serves to support non-discriminatory public interests in the area of 
development—it is not inconsistent with development.321 James Anaya supports a perception of 
FPIC that does not uphold a general veto-right against state conducts.
322
 Anaya, however, 
maintains that the aim of a consultation process should be to obtain Indigenous consent while 
ensuring that one party does not impose its will on the other party.
323
 While supporting this view, 
Bas Rombouts posits that FPIC primarily aims to ―fully integrate [I]ndigenous peoples into 
decision-making processes that affect them. It is, therefore, better to focus on how these 
processes should be shaped than to restrict the debate to whether FPIC includes a right to block 
decisions.‖324 Martin Papillon & Thierry Rodon stressed that ―…both historic land cession 
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treaties and modern land claims settlements are based on a similar principle, which is rooted in 
the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the subsequent Treaty of Niagara.‖325 
To Philippe Hanna and Frank Vanclay, FPIC is to be viewed as a philosophy, a ‗right to be 
consulted‘ and not a legal procedure.326 Therefore, where government activities affect 
Indigenous communities, the potentially affected Indigenous groups have the right to be 
consulted and their views addressed and respected, irrespective of the reach of the domestic 
legislation requirements.
327
 This point appears similar to Canada‘s view of UNDRIP and the 
FPIC standard as an aspirational concept. 
Justifying its opposition, Canada expressed concern that if FPIC is interpreted as conferring an 
absolute or unilateral veto power, then Aboriginal peoples may usurp the privilege. This 
assertion has been refuted as not having any basis because neither in UNDRIP nor in the broader 
body of international law is there a right to veto.
328
 Much as the duty to consult and 
accommodate or consent as articulated by the Court in Tsilhqot’in does not imply a veto or 
absolute right, FPIC in UNDRIP is applied in proportion to the potential harm to the rights of 
Indigenous peoples and to the strength of these rights and therefore not a veto.
329
 Nowhere in the 
UNDRIP is the word veto used. FPIC consequently does not give rise to any incompatibility with 
Canadian constitutional law. Moreover, the Supreme Court has also in many cases emphatically 
held that the duty to consult does not confer a veto-right.
330
  
What is FPIC, then? The word ‗free‘ indicates that consultation process should be implemented 
without any form of pressure and harassment. The term ‗prior‘ suggests that consultation should 
be conducted before carrying out a project that is capable of affecting Indigenous peoples.  The 
term ‗informed‘ implies that Indigenous peoples should be given sufficient information 
regarding a proposed development, including the nature and likely impacts, size, location, scope, 
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and duration of the development. FPIC, therefore, is minimally interpreted as requiring 
consultation with Indigenous peoples in good faith with the intention of reaching an agreement 
before proceeding with a project, particularly when a proposed development is capable of 
affecting Indigenous peoples‘ rights. While FPIC does not give rise to a general right to veto, 
states should not be too rigid to read this in a very restrictive way.  
 
5.1.2 Rights are Generally not Absolute 
Consent is not a general right to veto.. An understanding of a right to a veto to mean that any 
kind of project can be rejected, ―in relation to matters that can be in the legitimate interests, not 
only of the [i]ndigenous party, but also of national society in general, is not consistent with the 
standard of participatory consultation which is incorporated into international norms.‖331 
Furthermore, writers like Anaya have said that consent is an important precondition for 
implementing a proposed action where the action could have a significant impact. In this case, it 
is not enough to obtain Indigenous consent through agreements— Indigenous peoples could 
withhold their consent. 
In examining the misinterpretation around the import of consent, it also important to note that the 
provision of Article 46(2) of the UNDRIP appears as a restriction on how to implement those 
rights articulated in UNDRIP. Article 46 (2) provides that:  
The exercise of the rights set forth in this Declaration shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law and in accordance with international human rights 
obligations. Any such limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly necessary 
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms 
of others and for meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic 
society.  
It is safe to state that the parameters for recognizing when consent is required are still at the 
formation stage, as varying opinions exist in relation to when FPIC should be mandatory. These 
inconsistencies within the consent regime are reflections of the difficulties in the development of 
the spectrum of participatory rights. 
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In Saramaka v Suriname
332
 the court held that effective participation by the Indigenous people 
involved is necessary ―when dealing with major development or investment plans that may have 
a profound impact‖ on Indigenous property rights and that the Indigenous people‘s FPIC will be 
required in accordance with their traditions and customs.
333
 The court also considered ―large-
scale development or investment projects‖ as those activities that would have major impacts on 
Indigenous property which requires the state not only to comply with the duty to consult but also 
to obtain Indigenous consent in accordance with the Indigenous peoples‘ customs and 
traditions.
334
 The Inter-American court in its Interpretive Judgment held that consent is required 
when the effect of a state‘s action could affect the integrity of the Indigenous peoples‘ traditional 
lands or natural resources.  
Article 10 and 29(2) of the UNDRIP for example provides for circumstances when Indigenous 
consent is required. Under these articles, consent is needed for relocation of Indigenous peoples 
from their territory or before storage or disposal of hazardous materials. There are also a number 
of other constructions that have evolved as to when Indigenous consent may be required. In line 
with the UNDRIP, the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as well as the 
International Financial Corporation‘s Performance Standard 7, for instance, have formulated 
circumstances when Indigenous consent may be required.
335
  
 
5.2 Consent Standard 
While Indigenous legal systems have long had counterparts in various ways, the concept of 
―informed consent‖, using this specific term, was initially used generally in the field of clinical 
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research.
336
 This practice, using the Western legal terminology of ―informed consent‖, was 
originally applied in modern medical practice in terms of doctor-patient relationships. The 
Nuremberg Code of 1947 was among the earliest written legal codifications of FPIC relating to 
conditions under which research and experimentation could be carried out on human beings.
337
 
According to Schroder, ―obtaining informed consent has become an essential part of modern 
medical practice.‖338 To date, the concept of informed consent is still actively applied in the area 
of medical ethics. The projection of the conception outside the medical field culminated in the 
use of the idea in the context of trans-boundary movement of hazardous materials. In the 1980s 
and the 1990s, it was applied in the context of project development on Indigenous peoples‘ 
land.
339
 Informed consent has increasingly been argued to be an important instrument for 
securing Indigenous approval before carrying out development on their traditional land. 
Meaningful consultation plays an important role in achieving Indigenous consent. One question 
which may arise at this point is: what is considered ―meaningful consultation?‖ 
Meaningful consultation involves sharing of power with affected Aboriginal peoples—it 
provides all parties a proportionate power required to negotiate on a level playing field. 
Meaningful consultation includes the right of the affected Aboriginal communities to be able to 
say no to planned development, as ―consultation and participation will ring hollow if the 
potentially affected communities can say anything except ‗no‘‖340 The Legal Department of the 
World Bank Group (―WBG‖) has specified that meaningful consultation should be construed as 
the ability to say no.
341
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The term ―meaningful consultation‖ has also been used in bank-financed projects. The World 
Bank explained that it is important to consider the views of affected groups.
342
 Considering the 
views of affected groups will be achieved through a meaningful consultation, which requires 
borrowers to furnish potentially affected local groups with vital information on the intended 
project. Information should be delivered on time and made accessible to the affected groups 
consulted. 
It is notable that the preceding discussion of the origins of consent is a Western account. 
Aboriginal people‘s perception of consent is different from common law perspectives. Presently, 
there is no agreement on what acquiring consent requires.
343
 Generally, Aboriginal peoples 
understand FPIC as a bedrock for Aboriginal self-determination governance process. Although to 
some Aboriginal peoples, FPIC is perceived as a right to veto a project unless Aboriginal consent 
is obtained. However, some Aboriginal peoples perceive consent as a protective instrument for 
the rights held by Aboriginal peoples, which are inherent in the right to self-determination.
344
  
With this perception, many Aboriginal peoples seek genuine participation, full transparency, and 
regards for Aboriginal Peoples‘ consultation processes- they require that projects to be carried 
out, having regards to their views as to how they want their land to be used. 
 
5.2.1 Implementing a Consent Standard 
There is a need to clarify that this section does align with Barelli‘s flexible approach to consent. 
While many controversies abound as to the correct interpretation of ―consent‖ in FPIC, Barelli 
clarifies that the expression ―in order to obtain‖ Indigenous consent should not be construed as 
mandating upon states an absolute obligation to obtain Indigenous consent. In other words, FPIC 
does not imply an absolute right to veto. However, for adequate protection of Indigenous 
peoples‘ rights, Articles 19 and 32 should not be construed in an ―overly restrictive‖ manner.345 
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FPIC should, therefore, be articulated within the spirit of the UNDRIP for adequate protection of 
Aboriginal peoples‘ rights over their traditional territories. In this way, the duty to consult should 
be interpreted within the spirit of section 35, because if Canada implements decisions in the face 
of Aboriginal opposition to developments that are capable of producing adverse consequences on 
Aboriginal rights, the very purpose of these rights entrenched in the constitution would be 
severely defeated.
346
   
The duty to consult as presently framed appears to imply that once the procedural requirements 
are reached, no ―substantive‖ rights need additional protection.347 This is not a good ―recipe‖ for 
meaningful consultation, and will most often result in prolonged conflict rather than 
reconciliation. The Court specified in Mikisew Cree, 2018, that ―the principle of reconciliation 
and not rigid formalism should drive the development of Aboriginal law.‖348 The Crown‘s 
approach to consultation has a significant role to play in developing a mutual Crown-Aboriginal 
relation, irrespective of the outcome of the consultation process. Moreover, the need for 
reconciliation makes it necessary for the Crown to conduct itself with honour in dealing with 
Aboriginal peoples, engaging Aboriginal peoples with an outlook to reach an agreement. 
Therefore, a collaborative approach between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, which focuses 
on obtaining consent as an objective of consultation, rather than a ―no veto-right” and the “status 
of rights held at law” approach will be far-reaching and its prospective impacts transformative. 
This approach, of course, could begin with many other major future projects, such as SMRs.  
Implementation of a consent standard will have significant impacts on future resource 
development in Canada. A duty to consult that is modelled after FPIC could ensure a meaningful 
consultation process that helps to resolve areas of disagreements, provide proponents with a good 
foundation for creating collaborative relationships with Aboriginal peoples.  
Moreover, the concept of consent is not entirely missing in Canadian law, although it has been 
argued to be almost non-existent.
349
 In Tsilhqot’in, the Court sets a consent standard that is 
limited to cases involving established Aboriginal title.
350
 The court held that consent lies at the 
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very high end of the spectrum and that its infringement is conditioned upon justification of a 
compelling and significant public purpose. However, just as in cases of asserted Aboriginal 
rights or claims, the Crown reserves the unilateral power to infringe on Aboriginal established 
title.
351
 Even though consent is required here, the Crown may approach consultation process 
merely to justify a proposed unilateral infringement and nothing more. Hamilton and Nichols 
argue that even if the Crown‘s unilateral infringement power is excluded, the difficulties and 
costs relating to establishment of Aboriginal title or negotiated settlements in terms of modern 
treaties imply that a consent standard is almost not in existence in Canada. The Crown‘s 
unilateral power of infringement reduces meaningful dialogue regarding the level of Aboriginal 
rights and the Crown‘s obligations, leading to disagreements and numerous litigations.352 In 
Secession Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada specified that negotiations in a ―thick‖ 
constitutional framework ―actually undermine the obligation to negotiate and render it hollow‖353 
The court explained further that: 
Refusal of a party to conduct negotiations in a manner consistent with constitutional 
principles and values would seriously put at risk the legitimacy of that party‘s assertion of 
its rights, and perhaps the negotiation process as a whole. Those who quite legitimately 
insist upon the importance of upholding the rule of law cannot at the same time be 
oblivious to the need to act in conformity with constitutional principles and values, and 
so do their part to contribute to the maintenance and promotion of an environment in 
which the rule of law may flourish.
354
 
Meaningful negotiation can be achieved if Canada removes its focus on ―unilateralism.‖355 In 
Ktunaxa Nation, the court held that where the Crown meets its procedural obligations, 
development may go on without Aboriginal consent. Allowing the Crown to implement projects 
which may have adverse consequences on Aboriginal peoples‘ traditional lands, as well as 
Aboriginal peoples‘ cultures and lives will frustrate the spirit of section 35, the main purpose of 
enacting a special legal framework for Aboriginal peoples‘ rights.356  
Furthermore, the consent standard should be extended in the context of treaty rights, especially if 
the Crown decision has a potential adverse impact, resulting in a complete erosion of the exercise 
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of treaty rights. Also, the government‘s interpretation of the historic treaties in a manner that 
limits its obligations to improve Crown-Aboriginal relationships and meet its commitments in 
the treaties would result in a relationship marked by distrust.
357
 Obtaining consent regarding 
treaty rights should focus more on the possible adverse impact of future activities on Aboriginal 
treaty rights, irrespective of particular disputed interpretations of treaties.
358
 A commitment to 
implement the duty to consult using FPIC as a standard could ensure that the Crown collaborates 
with Aboriginal peoples to address Aboriginal concerns seeking to obtain consent rather than 
leveraging disputed treaty terms to avoid meaningful consultation.
359
  
Canada is enthusiastic about exploring several options for reliable sources of energy and 
unlocking the many benefits that its natural resources can offer, but that does not mean Canada 
may circumvent its constitutional duties to protect Aboriginal and treaty rights. Although it is 
agreed that Aboriginal peoples do not have a veto right, the Crown should avoid engaging 
Aboriginal communities in solely minimalist ways. While it is natural that the Canadian 
government will often align its interest with development, this must not be permitted to threaten 
the continued exercise of Aboriginal and treaty rights or result in an erosion of these rights on 
account of the public interest. If the cumulative effect of consultation for development eventually 
leads to the complete erosion of Aboriginal and treaty right, leaving the Aboriginal communities 
with no right to exercise, then Canada may not be anywhere close to reconciliation. Section 35 
will become meaningless and protect no more rights.  If consultation is implemented with a 
minimalistic approach in the placement of SMRs, it will be challenging to believe in its prospects 
to improve Crown-Aboriginal reconciliation.
360
  
The procedural aspect of the duty to consult developed without consent as an aim appears to 
make no sense of the phrase ―finding a middle ground.‖ The current practice of Canadian 
consultation suggests that Aboriginal peoples could always be at the receiving end of decisions, 
even before the Crown approaches them for negotiation. Gordon Christie‘s illustration noted that 
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it is almost certain that a decision to construct a road made through a consultation process will 
proceed.
361
  
The result of this approach is that even before decisions are made, the Crown may have 
concluded that a proposed project must be approved. In any case, the decision to implement a 
decision in the face of Aboriginal opposition could be covered by the public interest justification 
with the power of unilateral infringement. This begs the question: are Aboriginal communities 
different from the rest of the public in favour of whom ―public interest‖ is applied? A public 
interest philosophy that protects the right of development of a section of the public, but tends to 
gradually erode the constitutionally protected rights of the other section of the public (Aboriginal 
peoples) will most likely not achieve the goal of reconciliation. In line with this argument, Doyle 
states that:  
Consultation, negotiations, participation and partnership without a requirement of consent 
freeze existing power relations and leaves Indigenous peoples with little leverage to 
influence the outcome of the decision-making process […] States, national organizations, 
global financial institutions, and transactional extractive corporations currently hold the 
decision-making power and many of them are clearly reluctant to share it with 
Indigenous peoples.
362
      
The interactions between Aboriginal peoples and resource development on many occasions have 
met lots of confrontations and in some cases, led to protracted projects. For example, the 
proposed Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion Project (a $6.8 billion construction project) has 
been delayed partly because of an alleged failure to consult some affected Aboriginal 
communities.
363
 The proponent had already invested hundreds of millions of dollars before the 
project was stalled. Similarly, the Northern Gateway Pipeline was confronted with much 
Aboriginal opposition as a result of inadequate consultation, and consequently a decision against 
the approval of the project.
364
 It is important to note that about $600 million had been invested in 
the project before its cancellation. Additionally, the Energy East project and Petronas 
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Northwest's multi-billion-dollar liquefied natural gas plant project suffered similar fates as the 
projects mentioned above, out of a mix of factors including Indigenous issues.
365
  
In the Trans Mountain case (Tsleil-Waututh Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), the Federal 
Court of Appeal held that the Crown failed to discharge the duty to consult adequately.
366
 While 
expressing the importance of meaningful dialogue in consultation process, the court states that:  
Canada was required to do more than receive and understand the concerns of the 
Indigenous applicants. Canada was required to engage in a considered, meaningful two-
way dialogue. Canada‘s ability to do so was constrained by the manner in which its 
representatives on the Crown consultation team implemented their mandate. For the most 
part, Canada‘s representatives limited their mandate to listening to and recording the 
concerns of the Indigenous applicants and then transmitting those concerns to the 
decision-makers.
367
 
The Court also stressed the importance of considering Aboriginal peoples‘ input in forming 
accommodation. The Court indicated that the government should have considered the 
environmental impact assessments presented by the Tsleil-Waututh and Stó:lō while considering 
possible accommodations measures. This aspect of the decision in Tsleil-Waututh casts a positive 
light on the duty to consult. 
However, the Tsleil-Waututh case also shows the limitations of the duty to consult. The decision 
of the court in this case retains the aspect of the duty to consult, considering it as one requiring 
consultation and possible accommodation and not Aboriginal consent.
368
 The government can 
proceed with a planned action, not minding Aboriginal opposition, once the specified procedural 
standards are reached. Accommodation which fails to achieve consent (and, indeed, is not even 
aimed at it), therefore, can ―further the objective of reconciliation.‖369 This limitation may appear 
appropriate to the opposition of the legal arguments on advancing a consent framework, but the 
duty to consult regime does not provide ―legal certainty.‖370 Although the Supreme Court has 
specified the rules for assessing whether adequate consultations are met, and the Tsleil-Waututh 
case also seems to have provided further guidance, ―decisions will always be highly fact-
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specific.‖371 This gives rise to situations where parties are not sure of whether a consultation 
process is adequate until it is determined by the court. 
The Crown may approve a project without obtaining Aboriginal consent. However, it is also 
important to consider that such a project may remain subject to legal action, without a certain 
outcome. Litigation in the area of the duty to consult can be time-consuming. The cost of 
litigation and the possible delay of a project may raise the initial capital for the project, resulting 
in a circumstance where the proponent could lose confidence in a project.
372
 Uncertainties 
relating to Aboriginal rights in the areas of the legal duty could be seen as a disincentive for 
investors. For a project that has been on since 2013 to be cancelled by the Court at a much later 
stage causes negative impacts on ―investors‘ perceptions of risks‖ and on the ability to encourage 
investment.
373
 
Policies developing domestic laws to align with the UNDRIP or FPIC, in particular, are in the 
conception stages. British Columbia, for example, has passed legislation to operationalize the 
UNDRIP—the British Columbia Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act (DRIPA). 
The legislation specifies a process to bring British Columbia‘s laws in line with the UNDRIP. 
British Columbia‘s DRIPA states that ―in consultation and cooperation with the Indigenous 
peoples in British Columbia, the government must take all measures necessary to ensure the laws 
of British Columbia are consistent with the Declaration.‖374 
Furthermore, there are some instances where the government, Aboriginal peoples and proponents 
have developed agreements that mirror their conceived approach to applying the UNDRIP and its 
FPIC principle. For instance, British Columbia and many Aboriginal peoples have formed a 
―consent-based process for aquaculture in the Broughton Archipelago.‖ British Columbia has 
also completed an innovative agreement with the shíshálh Nation that is aimed at directing 
―consent-based decision-making processes.‖375 
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Consent should also be seen as a demonstration of a good relationship between the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples, not just as an extension of the extant structure of the duty to consult. The 
result of this approach is a ―focus on structures, including dispute resolution mechanisms, that 
govern how two or more sovereigns will address matters regarding lands and resources where 
both (or all) have decisions to make and legal orders that apply.‖376  
Following the above, it is important to address at this juncture that some may argue that a 
consent standard could result in endless negotiations, making it impossible for the Crown to take 
relevant decisions affecting the larger society.  This argument overlooks the point that consent is 
not to be interpreted as imposing on Canada an absolute obligation to obtain Aboriginal consent. 
Conversely, for the Crown to effectively protect Aboriginal rights, obtaining Aboriginal consent 
should not be interpreted in an overly restrictive manner. Additionally, while the case law that 
gives the Crown the power of unilateral infringement appears suited to prevent interminable 
decision-making processes, evidence has shown that court proceedings which Aboriginal peoples 
do not perceive as legitimate often lead to endless disputes.
377
 As Lavoie puts it, ―the power to 
delay and generate legal uncertainty is potentially just as effective as a formal veto power. Even 
in the absence of a formal veto right, then, the duty to consult can potentially operate as a de 
facto veto.‖378 
 
5.3 Finding the Path  
It has been stated earlier that FPIC has no formal binding force in Canada. However, FPIC could 
have a positive influence on Canadian law. Canada should encourage a greater consultation 
process aimed at consent expectations. This section discusses three ways in which consultation 
processes could function to pursue this goal: further developing the consultation jurisprudence to 
focus on consent as an aim; government co-developing consultation policies and practices with 
Aboriginal peoples; and more informed consent in securing Aboriginal approval through 
agreements negotiated by project proponents. 
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5.3.1 Extending Consultation Jurisprudence 
The courts serve as one of the forums through which Aboriginal peoples can seek help to resolve 
disagreements in relation to Aboriginal rights claims and protection of their traditional lands. 
Canadian courts can assist the Crown and Aboriginal peoples to develop their relationships in a 
new way regarding section 35. The Supreme Court has also stated that the constitution is not a 
straitjacket. Therefore the Court in itself is not constrained by the ―limits of originalism‖- ―the 
question of what the drafters and legislators imagined themselves to be doing at the time of 
drafting does not determine the future of the constitutional order.‖379 Consequently, the Supreme 
Court can return to its interpretative method to section 35 as it relates to the duty to consult and 
its grand purpose and describe it in a way that would allow Crown to negotiate with Aboriginal 
peoples who have been in occupation and possession of their traditional territory that the 
government wished to take. 
The courts could improve on the duty to consult jurisprudence to provide directions about the 
consultation processes more consistent with the underlying principles of the doctrine. While the 
duty to consult has evolved from the trilogy cases to the recent Mikisew Cree, 2018, there is 
room for the jurisprudence to develop further even under the limitations of the system.
380
 For 
instance, it has been held that the duty to consult is not activated by past impacts, and it is not a 
vehicle to resolve past grievances.
381
 But in what seems to be an exception to these rules, the 
Court in Rio Tinto referred to potential consideration of the effect of cumulative encroachment of 
a series of development as part of the context in addressing the effect of a present/proposed 
government‘s action.382 Besides, the Haida Nation case law was also extended by the Court in 
Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames as the Court clarified that the duty to consult could be 
discharged by a governmental body or a regulatory agency.
383
 With the decisions in Clyde River 
and Chippewas of the Thames, it is now clear that depending solely on an environmental 
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assessment process or a document that does not explain the significance of a process would not 
suffice.
384
  
Flowing from the above, the Canadian courts can encourage the development of consultation 
jurisprudence by taking a generous approach in resolving Crown-Aboriginal disputes. Adopting 
interpretation that is influenced by FPIC values while assessing how the adequacy of 
consultation and accommodation could create a flexible foundation for dispute resolution. This 
approach will generate possibilities and effective methods to negotiate in decision making in the 
context of the duty to consult. 
In developing the legal doctrine, the Canadian courts might investigate the attitude of the Crown 
representative in future consultation processes. The court may also delve into the question as to 
how the process was designed- whether the affected Aboriginal peoples were given the 
opportunity to make input as to how the process may be carried out and to the extent to which 
the parties made collaborative efforts in the process.
385
 The Court may ask questions such as:  
i. Whether an affected Aboriginal society was engaged at an early stage?  
ii. Whether consultation process was designed by both parties? Whether the relevant 
documents were made easily accessible to Aboriginal community?  
iii. Whether the affected Aboriginal community is properly informed of the project and 
its implications?  
iv. Whether the process was carries out in a manner that supports an advance in the 
Crown-Aboriginal relations?  
In asking questions (i) – (iv), the court is supporting the development of effective Crown-
Aboriginal relations. The focus of these interrogations does not stop at the general requirement 
of whether there was adequate consultation. It investigates the approach taken by the parties in 
arriving at decisions – an approach that facilitate a sincere listening to Aboriginal perspectives.  
The relevance of these questions is that it helps to form a decision-making process that considers 
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the perspectives and addresses the concerns of each party involved. Even within the operational 
restrictions of the Courts, considering both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal perspectives could 
lead the Courts to formulate a standard that becomes mutually accepted by both parties. This will 
build prospects and genuine ways for a flexible framework for negotiations in the areas of the 
duty to consult and accommodate.  
In applying question (v), the Court would be encouraging parties to avoid relations that create 
damaging implications for Crown-Aboriginal relations. Here, the Court would be considering the 
process and the decisions reached by the government in defining if a consultation process 
supports healthy Crown-Aboriginal relations.  
These questions may lead the Courts to analyze a concept of consultation aiming at consent 
standard. This would create a standard for proactive negations, restore sense of respect between 
parties, and make it difficult for the government to take on an approach of Aboriginal 
consultation that is minimal or employed as a matter of courtesy. Above all, these considerations 
would likely inspire parties to form a negotiation mechanism that is properly informed and not 
perceived as that which involves imposition of one parties will on another or violence or force. 
Furthermore, judges can take on an approach that acknowledges the options of potential 
reformation of the current structures and rebuilding Crown-Aboriginal relation. The Canadian 
courts could, for instance, pose a question as to the legitimacy of the Crown‘s assertion of 
sovereignty without demanding that the Canadian state disassembles or discontinues operating 
under the presumption that the is Crown is sovereign.
386
 This judicial inquiring could result in 
establishing better dispute resolution mechanisms through mutual agreement. This could 
promote negotiations that can change Crown-Aboriginal relations from those characterized by 
―pressure‖ and ―demonstration‖ to those founded on shared respect. 
 
5.3.2 Developing Consultation Procedures and Aboriginal Protocols 
The limitations and the uncertainty around the duty to consult are illustrated by the issues 
affecting the consultation processes in developments.  These difficulties seem to be growing 
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significantly by the day. One of the main reasons for these challenges is related to failure to 
provide processes that allow for practical recognition and respect for Aboriginal peoples‘ rights 
and legal structures.
387
 Government policies and laws for future developments may fail to 
achieve better Crown-Aboriginal relationships if the government does not think of better ways to 
make significant changes in the policies to promote reconciliation, which prioritizes long-lasting 
partnership with Aboriginal communities. 
 
5.3.2.1 Research and Development Stage  
Research and development is a relevant stage before any significant development or project. For 
example, SMR deployment will require the collection of ―expertise and knowledge among the 
Canadian nuclear community.‖ The Canadian government should conduct not just a well-
organized R&D program, but also an all-inclusive R&D program in carrying out fundamental 
research needed for ―capability development and deployment of SMRs in new applications and 
regions.‖388  
The view that Aboriginal groups are more opposed to SMR activities poses major challenges. 
There is a mindset that traditional plants raise safety and health issues, and SMRs could raise 
more concerns due to their novelty. Early and meaningful Aboriginal consultation would play a 
major role in clarifying that SMR risks could be lower than the risks from some ―competing 
energy sources.‖389  
The government should not just pursue a routinely foundational R&D.  Rather, it should 
highlight the importance of Aboriginal engagement and training at this early stage and also 
implement it. This could ensure the successful development and deployment of new nuclear 
technologies. Aboriginal engagement at this early tage will create an opportunity for the basic 
understanding of Aboriginal concerns and how to align them with the development program. 
This will enhance effective engagements all through the development of SMR, and not just a 
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model of consultation that will be carried out at the time the placement of the technology is 
required.
390
 
The above shows the need for Aboriginal involvement at the R&D stage, but there seems not to 
be much Aboriginal engagement at this stage. For example, on November 24, 2017, the CNSC 
held a Stakeholders Workshop Report: Application of the Graded Approach in Regulating 
SMRs.
391
 Eighteen organizations participated in that Workshop, whereas there was no 
Aboriginal representation. In 2018, a number of Aboriginal workshops were held as a relevant 
aspect of the SMR development plan. The Indigenous and Public Engagement Working Group 
(IPEWG) reported that these sets of workshops were conducted with only a subset of Aboriginal 
governments‘ leaders in New Brunswick, Alberta, and Nunavut. The essence of the early 
dialogue was to learn potential Aboriginal views on the development of SMRs and to recognize 
suitable modes for further engagement.
392
 While the IPEWG specified that the workshops were a 
significant early step and that much was learned, the IPEWG, however, indicated that the 
workshop was not all-encompassing and that there is much work to do to show ―meaningful, 
authentic and ongoing engagement about the potential of SMRs in Canada...‖393 
 
5.3.2.2 Joint Development of Consultation Policies  
One of the reasons for the challenges around the duty to consult is the failure to incorporate 
Aboriginal legal perspectives into government policies. The CNSC‘s Codification of Current 
Practice on duty to consult, for instance, merely codifies the case law without more.
394
 The 
Codification of Current Practice provides an opportunity for the CNSC and Aboriginal peoples 
to develop an FPIC regime by genuinely co-framing the policy as a government-to-government 
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decision-making process. This will assist the government and Aboriginal peoples to create an all-
inclusive process. 
A long-lasting foundation for establishing FPIC can be created by coming to an agreement that 
will guide governments, Aboriginal communities and stakeholders for a long period, ―without 
consideration of a particular project.‖395 The government has to consider Crown-Aboriginal joint 
development of consultation policies. There is hope that the duty consult is one of the major 
platforms in which a consent standard can be promoted, while providing greater certainty for 
implementation of the legal doctrine and limiting the growing number of disputes associated 
with the duty to consult. Consent could help parties to find common results and determinations. 
It creates a nation-to-nation structure where negotiating powers are balanced and ―authorities are 
aligned,‖ and dispute resolution mechanisms are created to resolve disputes.396  
A consent-oriented approach to consultation process will, therefore, involve a process where 
agreement is reached considering the standards which should be respected in given 
circumstances. It will determine the particular project to be undertaken and whether there are 
activities prohibited within a particular location, while at the same time providing reasons for 
such prohibitions. Where such mutual understating is developed, it becomes a keystone for 
operationalizing consent values to direct the government and Aboriginal communities and 
proponents in all projects. 
397
 The rationale provided by D. White III as how consent may be 
implemented could be used in this context: 
[Consultation policies] is a process where critical, early decisions regarding free, prior 
and informed consent can be worked out… If [the duty to consult] processes are properly 
co-designed as government-to-government decision-making processes between Crown 
and [Aboriginal] governments; if joint decisions will be made and implemented about 
what kinds of activities may occur where in a territory; if we agree on what parameters, 
what values and interests must be protected, and what processes and measures must be 
met for proposals to proceed in each area, then the foundation for decisions based on 
consent is set.
398
  
Additionally, the possibilities of Aboriginal opposition as a result of a perceived power 
imbalance support the rationale for considering Aboriginal consent in future projects. In many 
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cases, the power imbalance in the duty to consult framework seems to cause a stalemate in the 
development of Crown-Aboriginal relation. If Aboriginal peoples continue to believe that they 
are not offered the opportunity to participate in a ―consensus-building efforts‖ because all power 
resides with the Crown, they may lose interest in active involvement in negotiation. It has been 
noted earlier that the Crown may force its decision on Aboriginal peoples if parties are unable to 
reach an agreement. In this case, Aboriginal peoples could decide not to be committed to the 
decision, or even reject it outrightly. What this means for both parties is prolonged disputes.
399
  
In the current standard of consultation, Aboriginal communities believe they are weak. 
Consequently, they will hardly trust a negotiation process in which they believe that, in any 
event, the Crown has the right to make the ultimate decision. Hence, it is in recognizing a 
consent standard that the weaker party in the consultation process could have the feeling that a 
meaningful negotiation and dialogue could be achieved. This could minimize unilateral Crown 
power.
400
  
Also, Aboriginal communities can develop consultation protocols, which show a clear outline of 
Aboriginal interests and expectations. This could be done in collaboration with the government 
such that it could consistency in parties‘ expectations. Aboriginal protocols serve as clear 
roadmaps for Aboriginal engagement—they offer a favourable approach to better clarity for 
consultation responsibilities.
401
 Where there are inconsistencies that may lead to conflicts 
between the Aboriginal consultation protocols and consultation policies, parties will be required 
to negotiate on how to make some changes to the processes to promote a consistent form of 
outcome. 
 
5.3.3 Canadian Industry and Affected Aboriginal Communities 
It makes economic sense for the nuclear industry to incorporate Aboriginal consent in their 
policies for new development. Consent, which takes the form of ―shared value,‖ provides great 
opportunities for industry to advance favourably in Canadian resource and energy development. 
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Proponents proposing to carry out SMR activities on Aboriginal traditional territories could seek 
Aboriginal consent through economic relationships that reconcile proponents‘ lasting interests 
with the interests of the affected Aboriginal groups. This could reduce Aboriginal disruptions of 
projects and create cumulative shared value and ultimately minimize reputational damage.
402
 
First, proponents of future developments should recognize that Aboriginal communities have a 
distinct set of rights and traditions. In addition to their distinct legal status and relation with the 
Crown, Aboriginal peoples also have or desire to enjoy different levels of autonomy. While 
various aspects of Aboriginal governments have fuller autonomy, several others have to act 
within the framework of Canadian legislation. Many Aboriginal governments also have the 
capacity to enter into contracts with developers for their membership. Before any important 
decisions is passed, it must have the approval of a majority of Council at a meeting supported by 
the resolution of a band council.
403
 Decisions made by the Chief and Council may require 
Aboriginal communities to vote to ratify such decisions. In this regard, developers need to 
recognize different levels of complexities within the Aboriginal political structure, different 
agendas, ―family loyalties and ―community pressure points.‖404 These play an important role in 
recognizing how different Aboriginal groups will perceive a future development, especially a 
novel nuclear technology, and the resulting commercial relationship. 
It is important to state that Aboriginal communities as self-governing peoples operate largely 
within the confines of the Canadian legal structure. Aboriginal governments include elected 
bodies saddled with the responsibilities and similar issues asmunicipal governments.
405
 For 
commercial development arrangements, most Aboriginal groups in Canada are represented by 
their Chiefs and Council, including their advisors.
406
 Resource and energy proponents could 
effectively engage the elders within various Aboriginal communities, as well as the larger 
Aboriginal communities to reach a consensus agreement. The leadership have a role to play in 
making sure that the terms of contracts are respected and ensuring accomplishment of 
development even when there is a change in government or ―lack of separation between elected 
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officials and the business administration function, and transparency issues with individual 
elected officials.‖407 Aboriginal elders and communities will generally support a commercial 
agreement that aligns with their interests, notwithstanding the usual short office terms of their 
representative.
408
 The agreements between host Aboriginal communities and proponents are 
usually done through Impact Benefit agreements (IBAs). A negotiated agreement could play a 
relevant role in fulfilling the legal expressions of FPIC in SMR development, but it should be 
signed after the IA process has been completed.
409
 
IBAs are private agreements executed between project proponents and one or more Aboriginal 
communities.
410
 IBAs aim to reduce ―uncertainties over the legality and the legitimacy‖ of a 
proposed development. Proponents engage directly with Aboriginal communities to negotiate for 
a compensatory package, which generally contains measures for mitigating the likely impacts of 
a proposed project and economic profit in order to secure Aboriginal consent.
411
 In effect, project 
proponents have come to see IBAs as an essential vehicle for acquiring Aboriginal consent for 
projects in Canada. Parties who execute IBAs, for the most part, are ensuring to one another that 
they are committed to the terms of the negotiated contract—the expectations are that the 
potentially affected Aboriginal peoples‘ approval of the given project to proceed on their 
traditional lands, while developers provide financial benefits or compensations to the affected 
Aboriginal communities. IBAs may be considered as an important mechanism for securing 
Aboriginal approval for projects to proceed on their land. It also appears as a way to ensure that 
affected Aboriginal peoples have been properly engaged. In principle, IBAs aim to provide some 
level of legal certainty for development.  They often include an Indigenous commitment not to 
oppose a particular development or to initiate litigation outside an agreed dispute resolution 
process.  However, project developments are often involved in major legal challenges, 
suggesting that the availability of IBAs has not solved all certainty issues.
412
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Even more challenging are the limitations to IBAs as a way of implementing FPIC.  Most IBAs 
are usually negotiated without sufficient community contributions as they are kept confidential, 
although parties involved are moving away from this practice.
413
 Also, those IBAs which are less 
confidential only become available after they have been ratified. This could mean that most IBAs 
are likely to be approved or implemented without the communities having a comprehensive 
knowledge of what they contain.  This certainly does not entail the concept of informed consent. 
It is also Aboriginal legal representatives as well as proponents that are mostly involved in IBAs 
negotiations. The negotiation in this regard may create a negative process that is largely 
argumentative and generally dense.
414
  
 
IBA negotiations are generally founded on the notion that a given project will be approved. This 
presents a situation where the proponent places more emphasis on providing a compensation 
package as the price for obtaining Aboriginal consent to get the project approved. This, 
consequently, places less emphasis on exchanging information to create a foundation for 
informed consent. Negotiating compensation certainly ―creates a focus on quantifiable aspects 
(monetary compensation, share of profits, jobs and so on) rather than on more abstract but 
equally important considerations, such as the long-term social impact of the project or its 
cumulative environmental impact.‖415  
 
Some project proponents often set their minds on securing Aboriginal approval as quickly as 
possible to meet the timeframe for completing a given project. Thereby, IBAs could often be 
concluded and Aboriginal approval granted before Impact Assessments (IA) are concluded.
416
 
Project proponents ies that require IBAs to show Aboriginal approval to attract investors often 
adopt this practice. In other words, this means that Aboriginal communities may grant consent 
for a project without being informed of the full impacts of the project.
417
 A negotiated agreement 
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would not fulfill the legal expressions of FPIC where IBAs are signed before the completion of 
the IA process.
418
 
 
Furthermore, unlike FPIC which is implemented by the states, IBAs are negotiated by 
proponents. Although IBAs may indicate approval from Aboriginal communities, it could be 
difficult to sufficiently determine if consent in the negotiated agreement is actually free, prior 
and informed, particularly if the contents of the IBAs remain confidential. Therefore great 
caution should be taken as not to ―equate the negotiation of an IBA with FPIC.‖419 IBAs could be 
a useful aspect of FPIC. However, they are not by themselves adequate to express FPIC. The 
goal of IBAs is especially linked to economic compensations. FPIC has a broader goal, which 
includes not just the economic benefits for the potentially affected, but also the protection of 
their spiritual, cultural, and traditions values.
420
 
 
IBAs could serve as an important tool for assessing Aboriginal approval for SMR projects, 
considering the potential impacts associated with the nuclear technology. But, then, IBAs largely 
focus on economic benefits that may not address the broader Aboriginal concerns. More so, 
IBAs are in general ―elite-driven‖ and have the risk of not adequately including Aboriginal input, 
especially if the affected communities are not adequately informed.
421
 Hence, IBAs regarding 
future developments should include a genuine and effective deliberation process in the 
Aboriginal communities—the negotiation process should be sufficiently transparent. Thus, 
negotiated agreements for future developments should be signed if all important information 
relating to the project, including the environmental and social impacts are accurately assessed 
and accounted for and made available to the affected communities. 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion  
The duty to consult is a judicially framed principle to protect Aboriginal rights recognized and 
affirmed by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The duty to consult is expected to serve an 
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honourable purpose in reconciling pre-existing Aboriginal claims with the assertion of Crown 
sovereignty.
422
  The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly indicated that section 35 is aimed 
at the reconciliation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies in Canada in a mutually 
respectful lasting relationship. The duty to consult is not sufficiently inclusive or protective of 
Aboriginal peoples‘ rights. The duty to consult as presently structured seems to allow the 
government to approach the consultation processes merely to reach the minimal requirements, 
without necessarily achieving meaningful dialogue. This approach is at odds with the promise of 
reconciliation as the overarching purpose of section 35(1) of the constitution. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada‘s case law seemingly shows an effort on the part of the Court to 
preserve the Crown‘s assertion of sovereignty around the constitutional order in framing the duty 
to consult.
423
 As it turns out, the government is responsible for assessing the strength of the 
Aboriginal claim. The Crown also determines Aboriginal concerns and places Aboriginal 
consultation within the spectrum analysis- a process that takes time, sometimes, even longer than 
anticipated. Consultation with Aboriginal communities may also require that the Crown incur 
costs in providing resources for meaningful Aboriginal participation. Because of these issues, 
there could be inherent bias on the part of the government‘s agencies to assess Aboriginal 
concerns as minimal, an approach unlikely to support social or political harmony between the 
Crown and Aboriginal peoples.
424
   
However, the example at issue, one in which the novelty of the technology offers the chance to 
get things right from the beginning, helps to highlight that reconciliation is unlikely to be met 
under the currently constituted duty to consult. Many countries, including Canada, are proposing 
to transition to SMR technologies because of the numerous benefits associated with it, 
particularly because of its potential to reduce GHG emissions. SMRs are advanced technologies 
that have unique features, and are anticipated to supply energy to smaller electrical grids or 
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remote off-grid regions in Canada, many of which are in areas largely populated by Aboriginal 
peoples.
425
  
Reconciliation supports the Crown-Aboriginal relationship and seeks to foster long-term 
peaceful co-existence between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies in Canada. Many 
developments in Canada are potentially related to the rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples 
in Canada. An inadequately discharged consultation process could result in litigation relating to 
consultation or infringement, leading to an endless search for the ultimate goal of reconciliation 
and delay in implementing a proposal project. Aboriginal acceptance through meaningful 
consultation and negotiation will play a significant role in the possible outcome of re-building 
Crown-Aboriginal relationship such that it fosters reconciliation. A unilateral Crown action in 
decision-making does not reflect the idea of reconciliation.
426
 Aboriginal peoples should not be 
the only party doing all the reconciling. Therefore taking on a consent standard in the decision-
making process for future projects would ensure that Aboriginal peoples participate effectively in 
decisions concerning their traditional land and that future development does not suffer 
preventable opposition. 
There is hope that the Courts and the Crown could take a lead in the ongoing goal to achieve a 
mutually beneficial Crown-Aboriginal relationship in Canada. There is a need to go beyond the 
usual technical approach to the duty to consult to attain this goal. Doing so is critical in future 
developments, which could have potential impacts on Aboriginal peoples‘ rights under section 
35. For a project to remain subject to litigation or unnecessarily delay without any 
positive/certain outcome is something Canada must avoid. This could prolong the timeline set for 
a project and may even lead to cancellation by the court after much time and resources have 
invested in the project. This is enough to create negative impacts on ―investors‘ perceptions of 
risks‖ and the ability to encourage investment.427 A consultation process that aims towards 
reaching an agreement could encourage a diligent approach to consultation and enable Canada to 
develop an all-inclusive approach to reconciliation that recognizes the relationships between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians. 
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The judiciary has a role to play to advance Crown-Aboriginal relations in line with section 35. It 
has been stated earlier that the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that the constitution is 
not a straitjacket. The Court should therefore not restrict its functions in guiding parties in the 
ongoing discussions on advancement of the duty to consult. When the duty to consult issues end 
up litigated before the courts, the judges arrive at decisions choosing from various interpretations 
of the law ―which embody the values of different normative communities.‖428 There is an 
opportunity in that.  In making decisions, the judges could abandon interpretations of the law that 
lead to persistent conflict and adopt alternative legal interpretations that allow for peaceful 
coexistence.
429
 
The duty to consult failed to incorporate Aboriginal legal traditions in governments‘ policies.430 
The Codification of Current Practice and the CNSC‘s REGDOC 3.3.2 (Aboriginal engagement) 
for example, creates a chance for the CNSC and Aboriginal peoples to develop an FPIC 
framework by practically co-framing the policies as government-to-government decision-making 
process. This will assist the government and Aboriginal peoples to create an all-inclusive 
process, legal certainty, and procedural clarity.
431
  If Aboriginal peoples effectively participate in 
creating the frameworks that govern Crown-Aboriginal relations, they will be less likely to 
oppose government decisions based on those rules.  
A negotiated agreement could play an important role in meeting the legal expressions of FPIC in 
SMR development. IBAs could reduce uncertainties around the questions of the legitimacy of an 
intended development.
432
 This thesis, however, argued that it is important that IBAs are signed 
after all important information relating to the project, including the environmental and social 
impacts are accurately assessed and accounted for and made available to the affected 
communities.
433
  
Aboriginal peoples are not necessarily opposed to development. Those open to it, though, are 
determined to protect their territories, preserve their culture and custom for their continued 
survival as peoples, and pass on their territories, cultures, and customs to future generations. 
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Besides the complexity, there is an opportunity to engage with Aboriginal peoples. More so, 
proponents could benefit from reduced risk of Aboriginal opposition, the likelihood of litigation 
and reputational damage, and eventually, increase the value of future development like SMRs 
projects.
434
 
Finally, as opposed to the minimum-requirement approach to implementing the duty to consult, 
consultations for future projects should take up an approach that does not involve a unilateral 
exercise of power. Future development involving Aboriginal engagement provides an 
opportunity to get things right from the early stage. Expanding the Haida Nation case law is 
essential to accomplish the protective and reconciliation purposes of section 35—the 
fundamental goal of section 35 and the underlying principle in the law. Applying a standard that 
aims at FPIC would better respect the fundamental law on the duty to consult and thereby 
advance Crown-Aboriginal relations. Therefore, expanding consultation jurisprudence, co-
developing consultation policies and practices, and improving procedures for obtaining 
Aboriginal approval through agreements negotiated by industry could support this goal. 
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 Hanna & Vanclay, supra note 326 at 154. 
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APPENDIX:  The CNSC’s Approach to Aboriginal Engagement 
 
An Overview of the CNSC 
The CNSC was established by the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA) to ―regulate the 
development, production and the use of nuclear energy‖ and nuclear substance in Canada,435 Its 
past regulatory activity remains illustrative even after recent changes that affect its role. Prior to 
recent changes to implement the new impact assessment system, within this framework, the 
CNSC has regulated nuclear activities, including the deployment of SMRs, in Canada. The 
CNSC has had the obligation to establish a regulatory framework corresponding to international 
standards for human health and a safe environment.
436
 The CNSC has developed regulations that 
set out the relevant requirements to be complied with before applicants can obtain a licence for 
construction, deployment, operation, and decommission. The CNSC has been empowered to 
issue an applicant a license if the applicant is ―qualified to carry on the activity that the licence 
will authorize the licensee to carry on‖ and if the applicant makes ―adequate provisions for the 
protection of the environment, the health and safety of persons and the maintenance of national 
security and measures required to implement international obligations to which Canada has 
agreed.‖437 
The CNSC is required to use ―risk-informed approaches‖ to evaluate requirements so that they 
are proportional to the activity or facility‘s risk profile.‖438 As part of its obligations, the CNSC 
is required to take measures to ―limit to a reasonable level …the risk to national security, the 
health and safety of persons and the environment that are associated with the development, 
production and use of nuclear energy.‖ The CNSC has been expected to issue licenses to 
applicants qualified to undertake the nuclear activity and to meet Canada‘s commitment to 
international best practice.
439
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 Nuclear Safety and Control Act, SC 1997, c 9 at ss 8(1) & 9 [NSCA]. 
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 Ibid, at s 9. 
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Furthermore, the CNSC established a regime that sought to fulfill its consultation duty to the 
Aboriginal peoples and the public. Its regulatory framework included numerous provisions on 
consultation which could be juxtaposed with the courts‘ decisions on duty to consult. As an 
independent administrative tribunal, CNSC recognizes and understands the importance of 
Aboriginal consultation as part of its regulatory functions. CNSC declared its commitment to 
understanding the significance of consulting with Canada‘s Aboriginal communities to build 
mutual relationships with them.
440
 The CNSC also confirms ―that all its licensing decisions under 
the Nuclear Safety and Control Act and environmental assessment decisions under the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act uphold the honour of the Crown and consider Aboriginal peoples‘ 
potential or established Aboriginal or treaty rights pursuant to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982.‖441     
 
Regulatory Documents for SMR Licence Applications  
The CNSC has different types of regulatory documents (―REGDOC‖) that set out requirements 
and guidance on what must be fulfilled prior to obtaining a license for nuclear activities. 
REGDOC describe to licensees and applicants what must be accomplished to satisfy the 
conditions for the regulation of nuclear activities under the NSCA. REGDOC-1.1.5
442
 provides 
the necessary requirements and guidance needed for submission of licencing application to the 
CNSC for SMR facilities in Canada. REGDOC-1.1.5 also ―identifies considerations that the 
CNSC takes into account when assessing the adequacy of submissions.‖ It is noteworthy that 
REGDOC-1.1.5 is designed to be used ―in conjunction with consultations with CNSC staff,‖ in 
addition to the regulatory documents for site preparation- REGDOC-1.1.1,
443
 construction- 
                                                          
440
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Facilities, REGDOC-1.1.1 (Ottawa: CNSC, August 2016) [REGDOC-1.1.1]. 
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RD/GD-369,
 444
  and operation- REGDOC-1.1.3.
445
 These three documents set out requirements 
and guidance for an applicant to review prior to submitting a licence application.  
Consultation with potentially affected Aboriginal groups would be conducted at five licensing 
stages: licence to prepare site; construct; operate; modify; decommission or abandon a Class IA 
facility.
446
 SMRs are within Class IA nuclear facilities and thus licensees must comply with the 
necessary requirements for application under this class of nuclear facilities. Project proponents 
have a responsibility to demonstrate that they are qualified to carry on the activity described in 
the application, and have made ―adequate provisions to protect the health, safety and security of 
persons and the environment.‖447 A Licence will be issued where licensees have met the 
requirements set out by the CNSC, for example, for Aboriginal engagement. The level of 
Aboriginal engagement will vary depending on the licensing stage, the location of the identified 
site, that is, whether the site is subject to a title claim or falls under areas covered by treaties.    
An environmental assessment (EA) (or impacts assessment) may be required before issuing a 
license for siting. The CNSC was responsible for conducting environmental assessments. Where 
EA is required, the CNSC will inform the applicant.
448
 The CNSC has the duty to ensure that its 
licensing decisions within the NSCA and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) 
uphold the honour of the Crown. Also in its duty as a Crown agent, the CNSC may review a 
vendor‘s design through a Vendor design reviews (VDR) process. A VDR pre-licensing process 
helps to identify and clarify possible ―regulatory or technical issues that could arise later in the 
licensing process…and takes place before a proponent would submit a licence application using 
the particular design‖449  
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Nuclear Power Plant (March, 2014). 
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 Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, REGDOC-1.1.3, Licence Application Guide: Licence to Operate 
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It bears noting that currently, Bill C-69 enacts the Impact Assessment Act (IAA) which is now the 
governing legislation for conducting environmental assessment.
450
 The Bill replaces 
Environmental Assessment Agency with Impact Agency of Canada.
451
 Under the IAA, the 
Minister of the Environment has the obligation to refer impact assessments of nuclear activities 
to a review panel if the project includes activities regulated under the NSCA.
452
 The review panel 
is established by the Minister, including a chairperson and at least two other members.
453
 The 
CNSC may use only the impact assessment carried out by the review panel for the purpose of 
issuing licence to a licensee.
454
  
Accordingly, the licensing phases for SMRs would require adequate Aboriginal engagement 
prior to issuing a licence. The CNSC requirements on the duty to consult are largely provided for 
in Aboriginal Engagement Regulatory Document (REGDOC-3.2.2).
455
 REGDOC-3.2.2 is an 
important regulatory document that considers aspects of regulation on Aboriginal engagement. 
 
Aboriginal Engagement  
Generally, the CNSC engages with Aboriginal peoples and Canadian society as a whole to 
address their concerns about a proposed nuclear project. In keeping with its wide-ranging 
mandate, CNSC is required to account ―for the protection of the environment, and the health, 
safety and security‖ of Aboriginal peoples.456 The NSCA does not make provisions for 
Aboriginal engagement. However, the CNSC‘s approach to Aboriginal consultation is found on 
the Codification of Current Practice on duty to consult
457
 and REGDOC-3.2.2. REGDOC-3.2.2 
is more detailed in setting out the requirements for Aboriginal consultation. As an agent of the 
                                                          
450
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 Parliament of Canada, Bill C-69, online: <parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-69/royal-assent> (accessed 
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Crown, CNSC ensures that REGDOC-3.2.2 is updated to reflect current requirements and most 
importantly to engage in best practices in carrying out its functions.
458
  
The CNSC recommends early Aboriginal engagement for licensees in determining if their 
planned activity has possible adverse effects on potential or established Aboriginal rights and 
interests thereof. Information obtained by licensees at early stage could inform the CNSC‘s 
approach to Aboriginal consultation process.
459
 The CNSC will grant licensees‘ request for 
authorization only where licensees conduct a review to determine whether the proposed activity 
in their application:  
i. could result in impacts to the environment.  
ii. could adversely impact an Aboriginal group‘s potential or established Aboriginal 
and/or treaty rights, such as the ability to hunt, trap, fish, gather or conduct cultural 
ceremonies.
460
  
Where it is found that the described activity could adversely impact Aboriginal or treaty rights, 
licensees must submit their review to the CNSC, together with their licence application. In the 
alternative, the review could be submitted as a ―project description if an environmental 
assessment (EA) decision under CEAA 2012 is being sought prior to a licensing decision.‖461  
Licensees are charged with the duty to carry out research to identify potentially affected 
Aboriginal groups and decide the scope of engagement required for every identified Aboriginal 
group. To achieve this, the licensees, among other factors, will consider: ―historic or modern 
treaties in the region of the regulated facility‖ and ―potential impacts to the health and safety of 
the public, the environment and any potential or established Aboriginal and/or treaty rights and 
related interests.‖462 
The identified Aboriginal groups are provided with the preliminary information by the licensees, 
stating the extent of the planned activity on the licence application, the possible impacts and 
mitigation measures. Licensees are required to submit Aboriginal engagement report to the 
CNSC, which shall contain a detailed plan of proposed engagement process.
463
 Pursuant to the 
                                                          
458
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engagement report, licensees will submit information collected to the CNSC.
464
 The information 
therein will help the CNSC to ―ensure an adequate Aboriginal consultation process, to determine 
the appropriate level of Aboriginal consultation activities, and to carry out an effective and 
efficient EA and/or licensing review.‖465 
Licensees are also required to keep record of every Aboriginal engagement activities to help 
follow-up on relevant issues or concerns identified, including measures adopted to minimize 
impacts or to consider issues. Relevant information may include: 
i. meeting details 
ii. information specific to the activity described in the licence application that has been 
provided to Aboriginal groups 
iii. any issues that have been raised [relating] to adverse effects on the potential or 
established Aboriginal and/or treaty rights and related interests of the Aboriginal 
groups 
iv. any mitigation measures proposed by either Aboriginal groups or the proponent that 
address potential adverse impacts on Aboriginal and/or treaty rights and related 
interests. 
Following a receipt of an Aboriginal engagement report, the CNSC will revert to licensees, and 
may request that licensees furnish further information or clarifications. In its role to determine 
whether licensee activities will require Aboriginal consultation as well as the level of 
consultation, the CNSC will carry out a ―preliminary‖ duty to consult.466 Primarily at the 
preliminary stage, the CNSC identifies and creates a list of potentially affected Aboriginal 
groups regarding the license application, including additional Aboriginal peoples identified by 
the CNSC.  Where the CNSC decides that proposed activities will require consultation, the 
identified Aboriginal peoples are notified with the relevant information, including the proposed 
activities, potential impact relating to the activities, and the scope of consultation. After an 
Environmental Assessment or Licensing Decision, the CNSC may require the licensees to ensure 
that adverse effects from the activity be ―avoided, mitigated or addressed through offset 
measures.‖467  The CNSC may also require a follow-up regarding licensees‘ Aboriginal 
engagement. 
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Furthermore, identified Aboriginal groups are encouraged to participate in public hearings 
regarding the issuing of licences. The hearing process creates an opportunity for Aboriginal 
peoples to present before the CNSC tribunal the nature and the scope of potentially affected 
Aboriginal interests, including ―outstanding issues and concerns [throughout] the regulatory 
process, and to learn about any proposed accommodation measures by the licensee.
468
 
While the CNSC is responsible for discharging the duty to consult, the procedural aspects of 
consultation are largely delegated to the licensee.
469
 The CNSC considers licensees as ―best 
positioned to collect information and propose any appropriate additional measures.‖470 The 
CNSC may rely on the information gathered by the licensee and the proposed measures to 
prevent or mitigate or offset potential adverse impacts.
471
 Delegation to the licensee may likely 
incentivize disproportionate submission from proponents. For example, proponents may attempt 
―to cast [...] a very positive light [on] past engagement efforts‖ with Aboriginal groups, trying to 
avoid fundamental costs.
472
 In the hearing concerning an AREVA application, a request for a 
process and funding for the Aboriginal groups to carry out fundamental due diligence and 
assessment of the proponent‘s renewal application led to the abrupt ending of a meeting. 
Unfortunately, this may have been as a result of the disagreement between Aboriginal groups 
and the proponent as it appears that the proponent told the Chief of Buffalo River ―that she was 
threatening AREVA with a request and if she wanted to challenge the application at the hearing 
or beyond she was free to do so, and that AREVA would be successful as they have been […] in 
the past and they would continue to be successful in the future‖473 
The CNSC‘s REGDOC-3.2.2, suggests that the CNSC could deny a license application as a 
result of insufficient consultation. However, there is no suggestion that the CNSC has ever 
rejected an application on account of insufficient consultation.
474
 For instance, at the CNSC 
public hearing for the renewal and amendment of CNL‘s Nuclear Research and Test 
Establishment Operating Licence (NRTEOL) for Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) which is close 
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to Chalk River, Ontario, there was no Aboriginal participation.
475
 Despite Aboriginal non-
participation, the CNSC approved the applications. In addition, the CNSC approved the 
operating licence notwithstanding that it found that CNL needs to ―improve its proactive 
disclosure processes‖ which in itself was an allusion to the absence of full disclosure.476 By this 
decision, CNSC suggested that it sometimes applies a minimalist standard in fulfilling 
Aboriginal consultation. 
Furthermore, in Athabasca Regional Government, 477 the proponent‘s application for the renewal 
of its operating licence for a period of eight years was successful. The affected Aboriginal groups 
brought applications to the court contending among other points that their concerns regarding 
Aboriginal or treaty rights were not addressed. The notice for the pending application was not 
given and the Athabasca Regional Government’s effort to get all adequate information before the 
hearing was not possible as the information was provided during and after the day of the hearing. 
The Aboriginal groups also contended that questions they raised at various meetings were not 
addressed. The court rejected the First Nations‘ application to set aside the proponent‘s licence, 
despite the serious issues raised on grounds for the application.478 Despite Aboriginal peoples‘ 
contention that consultation was not adequate, and that no effort as to reconciliation was made, 
the court found that the CNSC did not err in its decision with respect to the duty to consult.479 
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